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In Chapter 1, I describe how taxation in the aviation industry has evolved considerably over
the last 25 years. Despite the vital role aviation and airports play in efficiently moving goods and
people, the effect of taxation in this industry is understudied. Understanding how passengers and
carriers respond to taxes and government fees is crucial to efficiently raising government revenue.
After an overview of how taxation has evolved in the industry, I document how fares have changed
following prior tax changes. Exploiting variation in taxes across similar routes and over time, the
results suggest taxes are over-shifted to consumers (i.e., a $1 increase in taxes results in more than a
$1 increase in the total fare). The chapter concludes with a discussion of potential explanations for
this result: the nature of competition in the industry and the propagation of taxes within a network.
In Chapter 2, I analyze how taxes impact prices, quantities, and welfare when products are con-
nected via demand or cost relationships. Exploiting spatial and temporal variation in taxes from
1993 to 2015, I estimate a discrete-choice, oligopoly model of the U.S. aviation industry—a net-
work setting where demand-side substitutes are straightforward to observe and cost complemen-
tarities arise naturally. I show that cost complementarities increase incidence on taxed products
and cause incidence to spill over across products. Taxation of hub airports generates larger spill-
over effects and greater negative effects on consumer welfare. Simulations of revenue-neutral tax
policies such as standardization of taxes across routes and subsidization of hub airports find im-
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CHAPTER 1
TAXATION IN THE AVIATION INDUSTRY: INSIGHTS AND CHALLENGES
1.1 Introduction
Taxation influences a wide range of behavior. For example, taxes in the aviation industry may
affect a passenger’s fare, the size of the aircraft a carrier operates on a route, and the number of
departures from an airport. Understanding the influence of taxes on passengers, carriers, or airports
is valuable in ensuring government finances are raised efficiently without placing undue burden on
participants. Aviation taxes are substantial. The mean effective tax rate, defined as the total taxes
and fees divided by the passenger fare, was approximately 15% in 2015.
Furthermore, how the government raises and dispenses funding has changed dramatically in
the aviation industry over the last 25 years. Despite this change, relatively little research studies
the extent of taxation or analyzes its influence on economic variables such as the price. This paper
makes two contributions to fill this void in the literature. The first portion describes how aviation
taxation in the United States has evolved since the early 1990’s. The second portion develops an
empirical model that exploits variation in the level of taxes across similar routes and over time
to estimate how equilibrium fares change in response to taxes. Initial results suggest taxes are
over-shifted to consumers (i.e., a $1 increase in taxes results in more than a $1 increase in the tax-
inclusive fare for the consumer). The paper then discusses potential explanations for this result:
the nature of competition in the industry and the propagation of taxes within a network.
Studying taxation in the aviation industry is difficult because the primary data set on fares
contain only total fares without any decomposition into the base fare, taxes or fees. Despite this
difficulty, several studies have documented the roles of taxes in the aviation industry. In a 1997
0This chapter is joint work with the following coauthors: Jonathan W. Williams and David R. Agrawal.
Transportation Research Record article, Heimlich provides a history of the U.S. Ticket Tax, ar-
guing the regulation of the industry in its formative years and airline travel’s characterization as a
luxury good influenced the level of taxation (Heimlich 1997). In a 2004 article, Karlsson, Odoni,
and Yamanaka provide a cross-sectional description of domestic airline tickets for the second quar-
ter of 2002 and find an effective tax rate of approximately 15.5% (Karlsson et al. 2004). Garrow,
Hotle, and Mumbower describes how the recent trend of unbundling fares has the potential to im-
pact revenue given the domestic tax structure (Garrow et al. 2012). More recently, Agrawal, White,
and Williams write a tax calculator that identifies the precise taxes paid on a given itinerary to doc-
ument spatial and temporal variation in the industry (Agrawal et al. 2018b). Prior to this paper and
their study, no research had comprehensively tracked taxes in the industry over a prolonged period.
International aviation markets are also taxed quite substantially and have a similarly sparse litera-
ture. In a recent paper, Bradley and Feldman examine the influence of international taxes on the
airline industry (Bradley and Feldman 2018). However, they focus on the salience of taxes and not
the effect of major tax rate reforms over time. They find taxes are largely passed through but not
over-shifted to passengers. Comparing empirical estimates of pass-through between international
and domestic markets is difficult due to differences in the demand elasticity, supply elasticity, and
other market characteristics. In the subsequent sections, this paper contributes to the literature by
studying the effect of taxes on fares.
1.2 Overview of Aviation Taxation
To summarize aviation taxation and interpret the empirical analysis in the following section,
one must define terminology specific to the aviation industry. A market is defined by the ordered
pair of its origin and destination airports as well as by its round-trip status. Thus, for cities A and
B, four potential markets are A to B round-trip, A to B one-way, B to A round-trip, and B to A
one-way. Within a market, a route is defined as the path or ordered set of airports used in traveling
from an origin to a destination, as well as the return for round-trip markets. Thus, two passengers
with the same origin and destination but different connecting airports are flying two different routes
within the same market. Throughout the paper, the word “tax” is used to generically cover both
taxes and government fees added to a ticket.
2
In 1993, carriers were responsible for collecting two taxes on domestic flights in the continental
U.S., both still collected today. First, the U.S. Ticket Tax is a percentage-based tax added to a
base fare. Second, a Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) is a dollar amount added to a base fare
for enplanements at a subset of airports that levy them. Subsequently, the U.S. ticket tax rate
changed, dramatically at times, per-segment taxes were added, various exceptions for rural routes
were added and eliminated, and new fees such as the September 11th Security fee were added and
modified. Table 1.1 summarizes the set of taxes and fees and how they have changed since 1993.
Table 1.1: Aviation Tax Reforms
Tax Type Change Year Description
U.S. Ticket Ad Lapse 1996 Lack of reauthorization: 0%*
Tax Valorem Lapse 1997 Lack of reauthorization: 0%
Statutory 1997-1999 Periodic decline: 10% to 7.5%
Lapse 2011 Lack of reauthorization: 0%*
PFC Specific Statutory 2001 Max increased to $4.50*
Segment Specific Statutory 1997-2015 Periodic increase: $1.00 to $4.00
September Specific Statutory 2002 Initially $2.50 per segment*
11th Fee Lapse 2003 Lack of reauthorization: $0*
Statutory 2014 Changed to $5.60 per direction*
AK/HI Travel
Facilities Tax
Specific Statutory 1993-2015 Periodic increase: $6.00 to $8.90
Note: *indicates vertical bar in Figure 1.1
Broadly speaking, two types of taxes are applied to tickets in the United States: ad valorem
taxes, which are a percentage of the base fare set by the carrier, and specific or unit taxes, which
add a set dollar amount to that base fare. The bold line in Figure 1.1 displays the mean effective tax
rate, which is the passenger-weighted average of tax rates across all routes in a given period. The
figure also shows the effective tax rate for a select sub-set of routes. The tax rates on individual
routes are the total tax due for the route in a year-quarter divided by the mean fare for that route
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in the given year-quarter. Aside from the lapse of the U.S. Ticket Tax during 1996 and 1997,
discussed in greater detail below, the mean effective tax rate has remained between 10 and 15%
but can be higher or lower for a particular route. Taxes not related to air travel, such as corporate
income taxes or taxes on jet fuel, are not included in these figures or in our analysis.
Figure 1.1: Total Tax Rates
While the mean rate of all routes has remained relatively stable, taxation on individual routes
varies considerably. For example, even excluding the lapses in 1996 and 1997, taxes on a round-
trip ticket from Memphis (MEM) to Orlando (MCO) via Atlanta (ATL), ranged from 10.9% to
25.8%. Variation is driven by non-tax-related changes to the base fare, but statutory changes and
congressional and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) authorization to levy certain taxes are
also important factors. The vertical bars in the figure indicate notable tax events, summarized in
Table 1.1, over the past 25 years. From left to right in Figure 1.1, these events are the lapse of the
U.S. Ticket Tax in 1996, the increase in 2001 of the PFC maximum per enplanement to $4.50, the
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September 11th Security Fee introduction in 2002 as well as lapse in 2003, the lapse of the U.S.
Ticket Tax in 2011, and finally the change in structure of the September 11th Security Fee in 2014.
To better explore what drives statutory changes in the tax rates in Figure 1.1, it is instructive
to outline how each of the individual taxes in Table 1.1 has changed. The U.S. Ticket Tax (also
called U.S. Domestic Transportation Tax or the U.S. Excise Tax) is the only ad valorem tax applied
to the base fare. Figure 1.2 shows the tax rate of the U.S. ticket tax from 1993 through 2015 for
flights in the continental United States. Figure 1.2 also highlights two notable features of Ticket
Tax policy over the last 25 years. In the 1990’s and again in 2011, Congress allowed authorization
to collect taxes for the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) to expire. First, from January 1,
1996, through August 26, 1996, itineraries were not subject to the Ticket Tax. Shortly thereafter,
Congress again failed to authorize the AATF from January 1 to March 6 of 1997. Finally, in 2011,
authorization again expired from July 23 to August 7. To calculate the tax rate, when taxes are in
effect for part of the quarter, we weight by the number of days in the quarter for which the tax was
not expired.
The second notable feature of the U.S. Ticket Tax is that routes involving certain designated
airports have a reduced rate. As indicated by the dashed lines in Figure 1.2, from the 4th quarter
of 1997 to the 4th quarter of 1999, flight segments along a route which involved at least one rural
airport were subject to a lower rate. Additionally, but not depicted in the figure, for domestic flights
involving Alaska or Hawaii, the tax does not apply to the portion of the flight which occurs over
international water or land. In lieu of paying the full U.S. Ticket Tax, flights with one endpoint in
Alaska or Hawaii and an origin or destination in the continental United States are required to pay
the Alaska and Hawaii Travel Facilities Tax, a specific tax which has gradually increased from $6
in 1993 to $8.90 in 2015 along with a prorated Ticket Tax rate covering the portion of the flight
over U.S. territory.
Besides the Alaska and Hawaii Travel Facilities Tax, three other taxes or fees also apply to
flights in the United States: U.S. Federal Segment Fees, Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs), and
the September 11th Security Fee (also called U.S. Passenger Civil Aviation Security Fee). A U.S.
Federal Segment Fee, or the federal segment tax, is a per-segment dollar amount added to the base
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Figure 1.2: U.S. Ticket Tax Rate
fare. It was introduced at a rate of $1 per segment by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and gradually
increased to $4.00 per segment by 2015. One notable feature of the segment tax is flight segments
involving rural airports are exempt from the tax.
Passenger Facility Charges are airport-specific fees assessed when a passenger enplanes at the
designated airport. For an airport to assess the charge, the PFC must be authorized by the FAA.
The revenue is treated as local funds and restricted to use on specific long-term capital projects.
First introduced in 1992, PFCs initially had a maximum allowable charge of $3.00 per airport. In
2001, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century increased
the maximum charge to $4.50 (the second vertical bar in Figure 1.1). A maximum of two PFCs
can be assessed on a one-way trip and four on a round-trip flight. Figure 1.3 displays the number
of airports assessing various levels of nonzero PFCs since 1993. The number of airports charging
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a PFC has steadily increased over time. By 2015, over 350 airports were charging a PFC, with
approximately 95% of them charging the maximum allowable $4.50. Just before the maximum
allowable PFC was raised to $4.50 in 2001, many airports charged the then maximum of $3.00,
although this was not always the case historically. After the 2nd quarter of 2001, airports steadily
sought and received approval to institute or raise the PFC to the new cap.
Figure 1.3: Breakdown of PFCs by Charge Level
The September 11th Security fee was instituted in February 2002 (the third vertical bar in
Figure 1.1) to fund transportation security infrastructure and TSA operational expenses resulting
from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Initially, passengers were charged $2.50 for
each segment, with total fees capped at $5.00 per one-way trip and $10.00 per round-trip ticket.
Authorization for the fee lapsed from June 1 to September 30 of 2003, which caused a slight
decline in the average fee for that quarter (visible by the fourth vertical bar in Figure 1.1). In the
3rd quarter of 2014, the structure of the tax was changed (the fifth vertical bar in Figure 1.1). Since
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this reform, the fee is $5.60 for a one-way trip and $11.20 for a round-trip itinerary, regardless of
the number of segments. Given a route, depending on the number of stops and round-trip status,
the reform resulted in a slight (60 cents) to moderate ($6.20) increase in the tax burden.
1.3 Effect of Taxation on Fares
The party legally required to remit a tax does not, in general, bear the economic burden of
a tax. In perfectly competitive environments, the less elastic party bears a greater burden of the
tax; furthermore, the change in the consumer price from a $1 tax increase is bounded between $0
and $1. With constant marginal costs, consumer prices rise by a full dollar. In more complicated
settings, however, a tax may be over-shifted to one party (i.e., a $1 increase in taxes results in
more than a $1 increase in the price). Over-shifting could be due to market power, products being
close complements or substitutes, or cost complementarities between a firm’s products (Weyl and
Fabinger 2013; Agrawal and Hoyt 2018). For the aviation industry, specifically, carriers’ market
power and cost complementarities from network transactions (i.e. the cost of a flight depending on
other related flights) imply a wide range of theoretical possibilities, including over-shifting. These
concerns frame the discussion following the results presented here.
Itinerary data are from the Data Bank 1B (DB1B) of the U.S Department of Transportation’s
Origin and Destination Survey, a 10% sample of all domestic itineraries in the United States. The
sample period ranges from 1993 to 2015 and the data are aggregated so an observation is at the
route-carrier-year-quarter level. Because the DB1B does not contain tax data directly, information
from federal legislation, the IRS code, federal memorandums and industry documentation dating
back to the 1990’s are used to determine the federal taxation on a route in a given quarter. Itinerary
fares are decomposed into the base fare set by the carrier and the individual statutory taxes owed
at the time of the flight based on the itinerary’s route. For a more detailed description on how the
itinerary fares are decomposed and the restrictions placed on the data, see Agrawal et al. (2018b).
The natural log of population and income for the origin and destination cities is from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. The remaining control variables are constructed using route characteristics
and flight information reported in the DB1B. Number of Carriers is the number of carriers oper-
ating in the market. Airport Presence is the share of routes a carrier serves out of the originating
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airport. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of squared market shares) for the market.
LCC in Market equals 1 if there is a low-cost carrier operating in the market and zero otherwise.
Brueckner, Lee, and Singer highlight the influential role low cost carriers play in determining the
competitive conditions within a market (Brueckner et al. 2013). Miles and Miles Squared are the
number of miles flown along the route.
Routes often have different tax treatments, both relative to other routes within their market and
across time as taxes lapse or changes to the law occur. To estimate the influence of taxes on fares,
one must control for factors correlated with taxes which influence the fare and restrict comparisons
to similar routes with different tax treatments. The baseline model, presented in Equation 1.1,
compares fares between routes with the same origin and destination, number of segments, and
round-trip designation. Using a panel data fixed effects approach, the average level of a route’s
fare in a year-quarter is explained by taxes, a set of controls common to the airline literature, and
time, carrier and market-segment fixed effects. By identifying the effect within routes that have
the same origin and destination (i.e., market) and number of segments, this specification allows
comparisons between routes with similar demands as well as cost considerations. Formally,
Farer,t = ζm,s + ζt + ζc + βTaxr,t + Xr,tγ + εr,t (1.1)
where the dependent variable Farer,t is the mean fare (i.e., base fare plus taxes) for route r in time
period t, ζm,s are market fixed effects interacted with indicators for the number of segments and
whether the trip is round-trip, ζt are time fixed effects, and ζc are carrier fixed effects. Depending
on the specification, Taxr,t captures either the total PFC or the total specific taxes on the route
in period t. The vector Xr,t is the full set of controls outlined below. The model builds on an
extensive literature in economics and transportation research which examines how demand and
cost factors correspond to equilibrium fares (Garrow, Jones, and Parker 2007; Brueckner et al.
2013; Mumbower, Garrow, and Newman 2015).
Failure to control properly for demand or cost considerations may bias results, especially if
implementation of taxes is correlated with uncontrolled demand or cost changes. Because they are
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unobservable to the researchers, many factors determining prices cannot be directly controlled for
in the regression but are intended to be captured by the model’s fixed effects. For example, the
model relies on time fixed effects to capture fuel price changes under the assumption fuel price is
set in a national market. This may not be true to the extent, for example, state and local sales and
excise taxes cause after-tax prices of fuel to differ across the United States. Time fixed effects also
capture macroeconomic shocks over the panel. Changes to the broader economy which impact all
routes are captured with the time fixed effect, but market-specific temporal shocks would not be.
Besides time fixed effects, the model utilizes market fixed effects. These dummy variables
capture time-invariant factors common to an origin-destination airport pair such as the non-stop
distance between endpoints and expected weather conditions at the endpoints. Because demand-
side characteristics and supply-side costs may differ for one-way and round-trip flights and by the
number of segments flown, the market fixed effects are interacted with a full set of indicators for the
number of segments and round-trip status. These capture cost considerations such as the number
of landings and takeoffs. While it may be tempting to narrow the fixed effects to the route level, the
identifying assumption is that time-invariant demand and supply-side variables are market rather
than route specific. Further, route fixed effects would eliminate all within-market variation and
rely exclusively on temporal variation to identify the effect of taxation on fares. Given many taxes
are a function of the number of segments, limiting comparisons to those with the same number of
segments is prudent, allowing use of some within-market variation while also controlling for costs.
Table 1.2 presents the results. The staggered implementation of PFCs at airports across the
country provides an intuitive source of variation to initially exploit. The coefficient on Passenger
Facility Charges implies a $1 increase in the total PFC along a route results in an average increase
of $1.65 on the tax-inclusive fare. The coefficients on the control variables each have the expected
sign. An additional carrier, especially if a low-cost carrier, is associated with a decline in the fare on
average. Higher levels of concentration at either the airport or market level, as captured by Airport
Presence and HHI respectively, imply higher fares on average. Longer routes are associated with
higher fares, although at a declining rate as indicated by the negative coefficient on Miles Squared.
It is difficult to know the correct expected sign of the population and income coefficients, as either
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could be associated with higher demand or lower cost. Given the controls and fixed effects, all four
coefficients are positive, although some are not statistically significant. Relative to a model without
controls, the coefficient on Passenger Facility Charges is stable, suggesting the fixed effects are
capturing many factors correlated with Passenger Facility Charges.
Table 1.2: Results
(1) (2)
Passenger Facility Charges 1.65∗∗∗
(0.21)
Total Specific Taxes 1.14∗∗∗
(0.10)
Number of Carriers -1.77∗∗∗ -1.84∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.43)








Miles sq. -4.95∗∗∗ -5.05∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29)
Origin Pop. 16.54 20.00∗
(10.46) (10.64)
Dest Pop. 46.71∗∗∗ 46.95∗∗∗
(10.16) (10.23)
Origin Income 41.80∗∗∗ 43.60∗∗∗
(12.12) (12.30)
Dest Income 13.14 15.26
(12.16) (12.31)
Carrier FE Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Market-Roundtrip-Segment FE Yes Yes
N 15,133,306 15,133,306
Note: The dependent variable is the tax-inclusive mean fare for a route
in a year quarter. Standard errors, clustered at the market level, are in
parentheses. Markets which have fewer than 1000 passengers per quarter
on average are dropped. Within a market, carriers who never serve 10
percent are dropped from that market. Taxes are measured in dollars.
Miles is measured in thousands. Population and Income controls are the
natural log of the origin and destination cities on the route.
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If the implementation of PFCs, even if not federal policy, is correlated with the introduction of
other taxes on average, as suggested by Figure 1.3 and Table 1.2, then the over-shifted estimates
from column (1) may be erroneously assigning fare changes from all taxes to some PFC changes.
In column (2) all the specific taxes and fees present on a route for a year quarter (segment taxes,
September 11th fees, Alaska Hawaii ticket tax, and PFCs) are summed together to generate Total
Specific Taxes. This represents our preferred specification. While there is some evidence of over-
shifting, the coefficient is reduced substantially in magnitude and not statistically different from
full pass-through at a 95% confidence level. However, the estimate is statistically greater than one
at lower confidence levels. We can statistically reject that pass-through is less than or equal to
one with a p-value of 0.08. Using the point estimate from this regression, a $1 increase in taxes
is associated with an approximately $1.14 increase in the tax-inclusive fare. The specification
with total specific taxes is especially appealing because carriers may only be concerned with the
pass-through of taxes overall, as opposed to the passthrough of individual types of taxes.
1.4 Implications and Justifications for Over-Shifting
While fares increasing by more than a tax seems counterintuitive, the prior economic literature
suggests over-shifting is common for many goods (Poterba 1996; Besley and Rosen 1999; Kenkel
2005). This section discusses potential theoretical justifications for this finding which may warrant
further research.
Even with over-shifting, the results do not imply profit increases for carriers or that carriers
would support tax increases. Higher fares do not imply higher profits because passenger quantities
and costs are likely to change as well. The preferred estimate of $1.14 refers to an increase in the
passenger fare. Within the increased price, the dollar of tax revenue is not kept by the carrier and,
on the margin, the increase in fare above the tax further reduces the quantity demanded. Also,
the quantity reduction could cause per-unit costs to rise (e.g. switching to a smaller plane). An
increased fare may cause profit per passenger to increase but weakly decreases total profit relative
to an untaxed scenario.
Network industries are especially difficult to model, and the policy implications of these re-
sults should be interpreted cautiously. First, aviation taxes appear to be largely passed through to
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passengers. This would be true even if the estimate of pass-through was merely equal to $1 but not
over-shifted. Second, taxes share similar properties with other cost shocks to inputs in production,
and those cost shocks may be largely passed through, or even over-shifted, to passengers as well.
Aviation taxation, and the industry in general, is complex. A number of interesting topics such
as the relationship between the unbundling of fares and taxes or the precise impact of the U.S.
Ticket Tax lapse on carrier profits, while interesting, are outside the scope of this paper. Rather
than attempt to draw broader conclusions regarding aviation policy, the results speak to the need to
conduct further research and explore potential theoretical justifications, such as market power and
network effects, which could cause the tax to be over-shifted.
1.4.1 Market Factors Influencing Tax Incidence
One possible explanation of over-shifting is airlines have market power on routes. Recent
theoretical work highlights the complex relationship between competition, demand and supply
elasticities, and how changes in equilibrium outcomes affect incidence (Weyl and Fabinger 2013;
Delipalla and Keen 1992; Muehlegger and Sweeney 2017). These studies suggest over-shifting
may arise with imperfect competition. With imperfect competition, the pass-through of taxes de-
pends on whether competitor firms are expected to match the price increase or expected to try to
steal market share. Without additional assumptions, it is difficult to explore how market power
interacts with the overall result. Simply utilizing a given measure of competition, such as Number
of Carriers or HHI, is unlikely to be sufficient.
Beyond the theoretical complications, utilizing the empirical model to make predictions, or to
accurately estimate how competition and taxation interact in the aviation industry, is difficult for
a number of industry-specific reasons. It is not immediately obvious what dimension of compe-
tition is most important when setting fares. Empirical evidence has shown market power at both
the route-level and airport-level is important for allowing carriers to set fares above marginal cost
(Borenstein 1989). Economic theory provides little guidance on formulating a hypothesis on how
a carrier’s airport presence might influence the pass-through rate of taxes. One possibility is an in-
crease in a variable such as Airport Presence represents an increase in a dimension of market power
leading to a higher level of pass-through. Alternatively, as a carrier’s Airport Presence increases,
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it has greater incentive to internalize the impact from changes in fares and pass-through taxes at a
lower rate. This effect is enhanced by the disbursement of some aviation taxes, such as PFCs, back
to their original point of taxation. Furthermore, effects of competition are likely to have substantial
non-linearity. The marginal effect of going from a monopoly to duopoly is likely very different
than adding a third or fourth carrier. Even with a long-panel and relatively rich data, the model
presented here cannot fully address these effects. Taxes may be passed through at substantially
different rates depending on the number of carriers, the price sensitivity of passengers, and the
ease of entry in a market. The results presented above likely mask interesting heterogeneity along
multiple dimensions of market power which could have rich regulatory and antitrust implications.
1.4.2 Network Impact
Airline networks, rather than simply connecting passengers between an origin and destination,
are structured so routes have a greater “density” or quantity of passengers along routes. These
“economies of density” are motivated by engineering cost considerations, notably larger planes
with a lower cost per passenger mile, and the ability of carriers to route passengers in different
markets onto the same plane to maximize cost savings. Many economists attribute the hub-and-
spoke structure of the network as the natural outcome of carriers reacting to economies of density
(Berry, Carnall, and Spiller 1996; Brueckner and Spiller 1994). Economies of density interact with
many economic variables of interest, producing interesting paradoxes for researchers to resolve.
Even a simple theoretical model can provide some intuition for how the role of a network might
influence pass-through and cause the estimates above to be over-shifted. Imagine a simple network
with three cities: two spoke cities A and B, and a hub H. Passengers can fly directly from A to
H or B to H (or vice-versa) but not directly from A to B. Passengers wishing to travel from A to
B must connect via H. As a result of economies of density, the more passengers on a flight, then
the cheaper the cost, and hence the lower the fare. Now, for simplicity, imagine a tax is assessed
only on passengers enplaning at airport A. Passengers flying from A to H, including passengers
with final destination B, will pay this tax, but a passenger flying only from H to B would not. The
tax will directly dissuade some A to H and A to B passengers from flying, as it raises the fare on
those routes. This lowers the number of passengers on both flights A to H and H to B (because
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there are fewer A to B passengers). The marginal cost of the flights increases because there are
fewer passengers aboard. Because the marginal cost of the H to B flight increases, then all else
equal, the fare for passengers flying from H to B will increase as well, despite not being taxed.
Thus, cost complementarity between different routes may cause taxes to increase fares on both
directly taxed routes as well as other closely connected routes. As prior studies have shown, cost
complementarities are likely substantial in the U.S. aviation industry (Berry et al. 1996; Brueckner
and Spiller 1994). These arise from larger, more efficient aircraft, using those aircraft at higher
load factors, and more intensive use of airport facilities.
Without more information, the empirical model presented above cannot account for the net-
work structure or any cost complementarity which arises as a result of that structure. If network
characteristics, whether cost complementarities or another factor, influence how taxes are passed
through to passengers, then the model could find over-shifting, because tax changes occurring on
related routes may be attributed to the direct tax change occurring on the route.
1.5 Conclusion
Taxation in the U.S. aviation industry has changed dramatically over recent decades. This pa-
per documents those changes and estimates a $1 increase in taxes leads to a $1.14 increase in fares
on average. This provides preliminary evidence taxes are largely passed through to consumers
and might even be over-shifted. Empirically estimating pass-through in an industry as complex
as U.S. domestic commercial aviation is challenging. The precise mechanism explaining these
results should be interpreted cautiously, as there are a number of potential explanations for this
result. First, as recent theoretical work has shown, when estimating pass through in oligopolistic
settings, one should ideally account for factors such as the precise type of competition, the cur-
vature of demand, and the elasticity of competition(Weyl and Fabinger 2013). Second, a defining
characteristic of the aviation industry is that economic activity occurs within a network. Even for
simple models, the role of network characteristics should be accounted for when one is estimating
tax incidence. Subsequent research should seek to address more fully the possible mechanisms
explaining the result presented in this paper.
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CHAPTER 2
TAXATION OF MULTI-PRODUCT FIRMS WITH COST COMPLEMENTARITIES
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of tax incidence is critical for setting policy to efficiently raise
revenue and to minimize distortions from taxation. As Coase (1946) notes, in most market settings,
products connected via demand or cost relationships can extend the burden of taxation beyond the
taxed product. Despite the theoretical ambiguity surrounding changes in price, cost, and ultimately
welfare when a tax is assessed on one product, there is little empirical evidence that quantifies the
permeation of tax incidence across related products. Quantifying the intensity of these secondary
effects can provide guidance for optimal taxation in these settings, and insight into related issues
like antitrust and trade policy. In this paper, I estimate a model of competition in the U.S. aviation
industry to measure tax incidence and calculate the impact of counterfactual tax policies in a net-
work setting where cost complementarities1 between routes and oligopolistic competition can lead
to widespread incidence from localized taxes.
The U.S. aviation industry is well-suited to the study of tax incidence and the impact of cross-
product relationships on incidence for many reasons. First, taxes are substantial, reaching 15% of
the fare under current policy. Second, taxes change frequently during the sample period, 1993 to
2015. They vary spatially, by type (percentage or unit), and the extent to which they favor cer-
tain types of products, such as nonstop vs. connecting. This variation is valuable for identifying
parameters and assessing the welfare implications of different policy characteristics. Third, cost
complementarities between products (i.e., flight itineraries) within a carrier’s network are well doc-
umented.2 Finally, the classification of cross-product demand and cost relationships is relatively
1Cost complementaries, or declines in marginal cost from the production of another product, arise due to the hub
and spoke nature of airline’s networks in which passengers share flight segments in route to their final destination.
2See Brueckner and Spiller (1991, 1994), Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller (1992), Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan
straightforward. Demand relationships are defined by a route’s origin and final destination. Cost
relationships are defined by a shared flight segment common to each route. For example, consider
two itineraries. The first originates in Boston, flies to Philadelphia, and has a final destination
of Atlanta. The second originates in Boston, flies to Philadelphia, and has a final destination of
Detroit. The Boston to Philadelphia segment serves as an input to both itineraries. Cost comple-
mentarities arise as the cost of operating a segment such as Boston to Philadelphia declines with
more passengers due to the use of larger, more fuel-efficient planes and the lower opportunity cost
of selling a seat.
Empirical research on taxation in complex settings is often difficult due to a lack of data.
Specifically, to measure tax incidence requires detailed information on prices, quantities, and taxes
at a disaggregated level for all products impacted by the tax. Also, adequate exogenous variation in
tax rates is necessary to identify its relationship to equilibrium outcomes such as prices and quanti-
ties. As in many industries, information on tax rates is not readily available for the airline industry.
One contribution of this research project more broadly is to collect information on taxes for the
airline industry. I collect information from administrative records (e.g., FAA, Homeland Security,
TSA), federal legislation and statutes (e.g., Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970, Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, American Infrastructure Investment and Improvement Act of 2007), and in-
dustry guidelines and documentation (e.g., Airlines for America and Aviation Services LLC) for
the period of 1993-2015. I use this information to code a tax calculator that decomposes observed
fares into a base fare, set by the carrier, and each of the taxes levied on every itinerary (Agrawal
et al. 2018b). White, Agrawal, and Williams (2018) use the tax calculator to provide evidence avi-
ation taxes may be over-shifted (i.e., a $1 tax results in more than a $1 increase in price). Despite
taxes composing a substantial share of fares, prior researchers have not comprehensively studied
the effect of taxes due to data availability. I contribute to an extensive literature on the determinants
of fares.3 I also demonstrate the utility of taxes as instruments for fares in the aviation industry, a
(1995), Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), and Berry and Jia (2010)
3See Borenstein (1989), Borenstein and Rose (1994), Lederman (2007), Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), Snider
and Williams (2015) to name a few.
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strategy which can be replicated to address a wide range of research questions.
To measure tax incidence across products and simulate counterfactual policies, I develop and
estimate a discrete-choice, oligopoly model in which carriers compete by setting fares. Specifi-
cally, I consider a theoretical model similar to that of Berry et al. (2006) in which carriers account
for their ownership of multiple products within a market and cost complementarities across prod-
ucts generated by their observed network structure. Passengers choose the route which offers them
the greatest utility conditional on the price and other characteristics of the route. I use parameter
estimates from the model to describe how taxes permeate a network and to conduct a series of
counterfactual exercises. Consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work on taxation in net-
works, cost complementarities increase incidence on taxed products and cause incidence to spill
over across a firm’s products. Taxes on more centrally located airports (i.e., hubs) have larger
spillover effects and greater negative effects on consumer welfare.
Changes to tax policy can significantly impact consumer welfare. In counterfactual policy
simulations, eliminating taxes in a quarter provides a transfer of $1.1 B, or 5.24% of consumer
welfare, to consumers. A more relevant exercise is to hold tax revenue constant and estimate the
impact on consumers from policy changes. Similar to Fajgelbaum, Morales, Suárez Serrato, and
Zidar (2018), one possibility would be to eliminate spatial distortions in the tax either by setting
the same tax on each route, or alternatively the same tax on each segment, while holding total
tax revenue constant. Standardizing taxes across routes increases consumer welfare by .2%, while
standardizing taxes per segment leaves consumer welfare essentially unchanged. Finally, I estimate
the potential welfare benefits from setting taxes which exploit the presence of cost complementar-
ities. Relative to a world with standardized segment taxes, I find consumer welfare improves by
.08% when the ten most central airports are subsidized. The relatively small change in welfare
for revenue-neutral tax policies masks heterogeneity in effects across routes and types of products.
The multi-product nature of markets and the cost structure of firms help to limit the welfare cost
of taxation. Multiple products or routes allow passengers to find close substitutes, while cost com-
plementarities potentially generate savings as passenger substitution lowers costs on alternative
routes.
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This paper contributes to several strands of research which span public finance and indus-
trial organization. Within public finance, the results are important for theoretical models of tax
incidence (Delipalla and Keen 1992; Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). Whereas much of the prior
theoretical literature often focuses on factors such as the relative magnitude of supply and demand
elasticities, the curvature of demand, and the nature of competition (Weyl and Fabinger 2013), my
model highlights how cost complementarities potentially influence pass-through and incidence.
Hamilton (2008) introduces a model of tax incidence where consumers purchase multiple products
from oligopolistic firms in a transaction. I contribute to the literature on empirical estimates of
factors of incidence (Poterba 1996; Besley and Rosen 1999; Kenkel 2005; Harding, Leibtag, and
Lovenheim 2012; Kleven, Landais, Saez, and Schultz 2014). More generally, I contribute to the
literature on the effects of consumption taxes (Kanbur and Keen 1993; Chetty, Looney, and Kroft
2009; Crawford, Keen, and Smith 2011).
Within industrial organization, my work contributes to the study of strategic decisions by eco-
nomic agents in network settings with cost or demand complementarities. Some, such as Brueckner
and Spiller (1991), Brueckner et al. (1992), Brueckner and Spiller (1994), Hendricks et al. (1995),
Berry et al. (2006), and Berry and Jia (2010), focus on the airline industry, while others focus on
industries such as telecommunications, payment instruments, retail outlets, and railroads (e.g., Jia
(2008), Ryan and Tucker (2012), Koulayev, Rysman, Schuh, and Stavins (2016), Houde, New-
berry, and Seim (2017), Malone, Nevo, and Williams (2018), Pus (2019)). Relatedly, economists
have produced a wide range of theoretical results for tax incidence in oligopolistic settings, includ-
ing taxes being over-shifted to consumers. My work contributes to the recent empirical literature
on how market power influences pass-through (Fabra and Reguant 2014; Miller, Osborne, and
Sheu 2017; Miravete, Seim, and Thurk 2018). Researchers have used empirical estimates of over-
shifting as evidence of market power or collusion (Marion and Muehlegger 2011; Pless and van
Benthem 2019). I also contribute to a growing literature which aims to utilize tools traditionally
associated with industrial organization to study a wide range of public finance topics (Bayer, Fer-
reira, and McMillan 2007; Conlon and Rao 2015; Griffith, O’Connell, and Smith 2017; Griffith,
Nesheim, and O’Connell 2018).
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Finally, my paper is most closely related to recent empirical work by Houde et al. (2017);
Flaaen, Hortaçsu, and Tintelnot (2019); and Agrawal, White, and Williams (2018a) which high-
light the interaction between taxes and the multi-product nature of firms and markets. Houde et al.
(2017) examine the importance of a firm’s internal cost structure, Amazon’s distribution network,
on the incidence of taxes. They utilize growth in the distribution network to infer the relevant
trade-offs between increased tax liabilities and reduced shipping costs. Flaaen et al. (2019) ex-
amine a set of differentially taxed complementary products, washers and dryers, and the resulting
change in prices. Lastly, Agrawal et al. (2018a) examine how demand or cost complementarities in
a network setting, the U.S. domestic aviation industry, influence fares. They use a reduced-form,
elastic-net methodology to infer which fares changes as a result of connections across products.
While taking lessons from each, I differ from these papers in at least two ways. First, I model
a setting in which both demand and cost relationships across products are relevant. Second, my
paper attempts to explain the distribution of welfare across a network of products, while Flaaen
et al. (2019) and Agrawal et al. (2018a) focus on price changes, and Houde et al. (2017) focus on
network growth.
2.2 Data
I use data from three sources. First, the primary data source for airline fares is the Data Bank
1B (DB1B) of the U.S Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey for the years
1993 through 2015. The DB1B is a quarterly 10% random sample of domestic itineraries in the
United States. The data contains the ticketing carrier, details on the connections made along a
route, and the total fare for a ticket. The DB1B includes only the total fare, inclusive of taxes, and
does not provide a breakdown of the base fare and taxes. For this reason, I utilize the tax calculator
from Agrawal et al. (2018b), which returns tax rates and specific taxes for each itinerary. In section
2.2.3, I provide a brief discussion of the different taxes which apply to the U.S. aviation industry,
all of which the tax calculator recovers. Agrawal et al. (2018b) discuss the tax calculator and the
evolution of U.S. aviation taxes in greater detail. I supplement the DB1B with characteristics on
the origin and destination cities. Per-capita income and population for each city-year are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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2.2.1 Sample Selection
I define a market m = 1, ...M as unidirectional travel between two airports, regardless of the
number of stops the passenger incurs during travel.4 Within a market m, a route r = 1, ...R is
defined by the ordered set of airports a passenger utilizes with a particular carrier c in traveling
from their origin to their destination.5 Time t = 1, ...T is at the year-quarter level. I include the
outbound and inbound legs of round-trip tickets as separate observations.
I restrict the sample along four dimensions. At the individual passenger itinerary level, I drop
both interline and open-jaw tickets. I exclude itineraries with fares the DOT deems unreliable and
itineraries with fares less than $25 or greater than $2000 in either direction, as they are likely to be
the redemption of frequent-flier miles or key-stroke errors. I drop itineraries with more than one
stop in either direction and those utilizing multiple carriers. At the airport level, I rank airports
by the number of originating passengers during the sample period and keep routes involving those
in the top 150 for which the BEA has population data.6 At the carrier level, I include all major
carriers which operate during the sample as well as smaller carriers who transport a substantial
number of passengers. The full list is American (AA), Alaska (AS), JetBlue (B6), Continental
(CO), Delta (DL), Frontier (F9), ATA (TZ), Allegiant (G4), Spirit (NK), Northwest (NW), AirTran
(FL), United (UA), USAir (US), Southwest (WN), Hawaiian Pacific (HP), Hawaiian Air (HA),
Trans World Airlines (TW), Aloha Airlines (AQ), and Virgin Atlantic (VX). Finally, I include only
segments which have at least 1200 passengers (approximately 100 per week) in at least one quarter.
The data are aggregated to the route-carrier-quarter level, resulting in 10,043,026 observations in
19,818 airport-pair markets.
Figure 2.1 describes the number of routes and markets observed in the data throughout the
sample period, which vary as carriers enter and exit markets or merge with one another. The
4This market definition is common in the airline literature. For example, it is also used in Evans and Kessides
(1994) and Ciliberto and Williams (2014).
5For example, nonstop travel from Raleigh-Durham (RDU) to Los Angeles (LAX) with United Airlines and travel
from RDU to LAX via Atlanta with Delta Airlines are two routes within the RDU-LAX market.
6The smallest airport included is Key West, FL. The first airport excluded is Charleston, WV.
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number of routes in a given period t ranges from 79,257 to 131,671 while the number of markets
ranges between 15,925 and 18,441.7 The number of routes and extent of market coverage have
expanded considerably.
Figure 2.1: Routes and Markets
(a) Routes (b) Markets
Note: The figures above depict the total number of routes and markets for the years 1993 to 2015. Panel (a) plots the
total number of routes. A route is the ordered set of airports a passenger utilizes with a particular carrier from their
origin to their destination. Total routes are equivalent to the number of observations in a given year and quarter. Panel
(b) depicts the total number of markets. A market is unidirectional travel between two airports, regardless of the
number of stops the passenger incurs during travel. Many potential routes exist within a given market. The plots are
conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1.
2.2.2 Variables
Table 2.1 provides a brief description and source of the main variables used in the analysis.
Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics for these variables, including the mean and standard
deviation when each route is weighted equally as well as the mean and standard deviation when
weighted by passenger volume.
Fare is the average fare of itineraries for ticketing carrier c on route r in market m during
period t. Nonstop equals one if route r is direct service from the origin to destination in its market
m. Distance is defined by the route flown and thus varies across routes within a market. Origin
centrality is defined by the origin and carrier on a route. It is the number of nonstop destinations
7Note this is relatively close to the full set of permutations for the included set of airports, approximately 21,000,
and thus close to complete network coverage.
22
Table 2.1: Variable Description and Sources
Variable Descriptions Source
Fare Mean passenger price on a route DB1B
Nonstop Indicator if nonstop service from origin to destination DB1B
Distance Distance of route flown DB1B
Origin centrality Share of nonstop destinations from origin by a carrier DB1B
U.S. Ticket Tax Ad Valorem tax rate (%) Tax Calculator
PFC Airport specific tax ($) Tax Calculator
Segment tax Segment specific tax ($) Tax Calculator
Sept. 11 fee Per-segment or per-leg specific tax ($) Tax Calculator
AK/HI tax Tax on flights to/from AK/HI ($) Tax Calculator
Nonstop rivals Count of rivals offering direct service DB1B
1(Rivals nonstop) Indicator if any rival offers nonstop service DB1B
Rivals routes Count of rival routes in the market DB1B
Market carriers Carriers in the market DB1B
Note: Outside of Fare and Distance, DB1B variables were constructed from the raw data in the DB1B
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Route-level Passenger-level
mean sd mean sd min max
Fare 292.19 155.33 219.46 99.59 24.80 3255.80
Nonstop .09 .72 0 1
Distance (in 1000s) 1.53 .84 1.07 .72 .02 7.54
Origin centrality .37 .24 .48 .28 .01 1
U.S. Ticket Tax .075 .02 .075 .02 0 .1
PFC 7.75 2.74 5.27 2.54 0 11.99
Segment tax 5.94 2.96 3.97 2.38 0 8.05
Sept. 11 fee 3.50 2.67 2.45 2.12 0 6.57
AK/HI tax .30 1.58 .18 1.24 0 9.90
Nonstop rivals .97 1.36 1.62 1.54 0 10
1(Rivals nonstop) .46 .71 0 1
Rival routes 9.56 8.46 11.34 9.36 0 77
Market carriers 5.01 2.13 5.35 2.18 1 14
N 10,043,026 6,966,031,550
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from the origin by the carrier at time t divided by the total number of airports. The individual taxes
are discussed in greater detail below but briefly, U.S. Ticket Tax is the percentage or ad valorem
tax applied to the base fare set by the carrier, while PFC, Segment tax, Sept. 11 fee, and AK/HI tax
are all specific or dollar-value taxes added to the base fare. All of the tax variables are products of
the tax calculator. Nonstop rivals is the number of rival carriers observed offering nonstop service
in market m at time t. The variable 1(Rivals nonstop) is an indicator if any rival offers nonstop
service in market m at time t. Rival routes is the number of rival routes in market m at time t.
Finally, Market carriers is the number of carriers providing service in market m at time t.
2.2.3 Aviation Taxation
Between 1993 and 2015, taxation in the aviation industry changed dramatically in terms of
the amount of taxation on any individual route as well as the type of tax or tax instrument used
to raise revenues. Table 2.3 summarizes aviation taxes and how they have changed during the
sample period. After a carrier sets a base fare, two types of taxes are directly assessed on domestic
flight itineraries: specific or unit taxes, which add a set dollar amount to the base fare, and ad
valorem taxes, which add a percentage to the base fare.8 Figure 2.2 displays the mean percentage
of a passenger’s fare, inclusive of both specific and ad valorem taxes, remitted to the government.
Since the 2nd quarter of 2002, and the introduction of fees related to the 9/11 attacks, taxes or fees
compose an average of approximately 15% of a passenger’s fare. As evident from Figure 2.2, this
is an approximately 50% increase from the beginning of the sample, when taxes composed less
than 10% of a fare.
Four types of specific taxes are potentially applied to domestic itineraries: the U.S. Federal
Segment Fee, the Alaska-Hawaii Ticket Tax, the September 11th Security Fee, and Passenger Fa-
cility Charges (PFC), many of which were introduced during the sample period. The U.S. Federal
Segment Fee was first introduced at $1.00 per non-rural segment in the 4th quarter of 1997 and
has steadily increased to $4.00 per non-rural segment in 2015. Flights to and from the continental
US and Alaska or Hawaii (or between Alaska and Hawaii) are subject to the Alaska-Hawaii Ticket
8Other taxes, such as corporate income taxes on airline profits or fuel taxes on jet fuel, are not captured by the tax
calculator or directly assessed on itineraries.
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Figure 2.2: Tax Share of Fares
Note: This figure graphs the distribution of the share of consumer’s fare attributable to taxes for the years 1993 to
2015. For each quarter it depicts mean, median, 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles across passengers. I calculate
each statistic at the passenger-level. The plot is conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1.
Table 2.3: Summary of Aviation Taxation: 1993 to 2015
Tax Type Change Year Description
U.S. Ticket Ad Lapse 1996 Lack of reauthorization: 0%
Tax Valorem Lapse 1997 Lack of reauthorization: 0%
Statutory 1997-1999 Periodic decline: 10% to 7.5%
Lapse 2011 Lack of reauthorization: 0%
PFC Specific Statutory 2001 Max increased to $4.50
Segment Specific Statutory 1997-2015 Periodic increase: $1.00 to $4.00
September Specific Statutory 2002 Initially $2.50 per segment
11th Fee Lapse 2003 Lack of reauthorization: $0
Statutory 2014 Changed to $5.60 per direction
AK/HI Travel
Facilities Tax
Specific Statutory 1993-2015 Periodic increase: $6.00 to $8.90
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Tax, which has ranged from $6.00 in 1993 to $8.90 in 2015. The September 11th Security Fee,
depending on the year and quarter, is either $2.50 per-segment with a $5.00 maximum, or $5.60
each direction of an itinerary. Finally, PFCs are airport-specific fees assessed when a passenger
enplanes at the designated airport. For an airport to assess the charge, the PFC must be authorized
by the FAA. The revenue is treated as local funds and restricted to use on specific long-term capital
projects. First authorized in 1992, PFCs initially had a maximum allowable charge of $3.00 per
airport. In 2001, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century
increased the maximum charge to $4.50. Figure 2.3 displays the total average specific tax by year
and quarter.
Figure 2.3: Specific Taxes
Note: This figure illustrates the distribution of the specific taxes applicable to each fare for the years 1993 to 2015.
Specific taxes are measured in dollars. It depicts mean, median, 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles. I calculate
each statistic at the passenger-level. The plot is conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1.
Itineraries in the US are subject to a single ad valorem tax, the U.S. Ticket Tax (also known
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as the U.S. Domestic Transportation Tax or U.S. Excise Tax). The ad valorem rate, which in
some years varies by an airport’s rural status, is set by the federal government. The tax applies
only to portions of the route over the United States. It thus does not apply if the flight goes over
international waters or Canada (i.e., involves Hawaii or Alaska). Figure 1.2 shows the effective
U.S. Ticket Tax rate from 1993 to 2015. The tax ranges from 0% to 10%. The high volatility in
the tax rate where it drops to 0% is due to congressional budget lapses.
2.2.4 Aviation Industry
Passenger aviation has undergone a number of changes during the sample period. Here I pro-
vide a broad description of changes along three dimensions; fares and total quantity of passengers,
product or route characteristics, and market structure.
Figure 2.4 provides the nominal mean fare for each quarter from 1993 through 2015 as well as
the total number of passengers traveling. The average fare has ranged from approximately $142
to $230, with notable persistent declines beginning in 2001 and 2008 corresponding to economic
recessions. In terms of passenger volume, outside of the recessionary periods, the total volume of
passengers has consistently increased, reaching nearly 96 million in the 4th quarter of 2015. Figure
2.4 also highlights the distinct seasonality, especially in regards to passenger volume, which can
make comparisons of consecutive quarters difficult.
Regarding product characteristics, Figure 2.5 displays the percentage of passengers traveling
nonstop from their origin to their destination. Even with a visually notable shift during the 2000’s,
the percentage of nonstop travel has been fairly steady, between 70 and 75% for most periods.
There has been a steady increase in the distance passengers are traveling. As seen in Figure 2.6,
passengers have consistently been traveling farther distances, with the average trip increasing from
approximately 950 miles in the first quarter of 1993 to over 1,100 miles in 2015. This could be
to a greater proportion of travel occurring in markets with geographically dispersed endpoints or
consumers selecting longer routes within a given market.
To provide a broad sense of market structure, Figure 2.7 displays the mean number of routes
and carriers observed per market from 1993 to 2015. Market structure has changed dramatically at
times as carriers have merged, entered bankruptcy, or more broadly expanded or contracted their
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Figure 2.4: Mean Fares and Total Passenger Volume
(a) Fares (b) Passengers
Note: The figures above depict the passenger-weighted mean fare and total number of passengers for the years 1993
to 2015. Panel (a) plots the passenger-weighted mean fare. Fares are at the market level and hence analogous to
one-way or half of a round-trip ticket. Panel (b) depicts the total number of passengers. Total passengers is adjusted
for the fact the DB1B is a 10% sample of passengers. The plots are conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in
Section 2.2.1.
Figure 2.5: Percentage of Nonstop Passengers
Note: This figure plots the mean percentage of nonstop passengers for the years 1993 to 2015. A passenger travels
nonstop between an origin and destination when they do not utilize a connecting airport. Within a market, multiple
carriers may offer nonstop service. The plot is conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1.
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Figure 2.6: Mean Route Distance
Note: This figure plots the mean distance of a route for the years 1993 to 2015. Distance is measured in thousands of
miles. In calculating the mean, each passenger is weighted equally (as opposed to weighting each route equally). To
put the figure in context, a nonstop flight from Atlanta (ATL) to Boston (BOS) is 946 miles or .946 thousand-miles
while a nonstop flight from LaGuardia (LGA) to Los Angeles (LAX) is 2,469 miles or 2.469 thousand-miles. The
plot is conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1.
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network. The average number of routes in market increased from between 5 and 5.5 during the
mid-1990’s to nearly 7.25 in 2004 before declining to approximately 6.25 during 2015. Similarly,
the number of carriers in each market has changed along a similar pattern throughout the period.
Before 1998, approximately 3.2 carriers operated on average in each market. Prior to 2008, and
the merger of Delta and Northwest, the average number of carriers had risen by 21% to over 3.8
per market. After 2008, carriers per market declined to approximately 2.8 most likely as a result
of the mergers of AirTran and Southwest in 2011 and US Airways and American Airlines in 2013.
Figure 2.7: Routes and Carriers per market
(a) Routes per market (b) Carriers per market
Note: The figures above depict the mean number of routes and carriers in each market for the years 1993 to 2015.
Panel (a) plots the mean routes per market. A route is the ordered set of airports a passenger utilizes with a particular
carrier from their origin to their destination. Panel (b) plots the mean number of carriers per market. As captured by
the difference in levels, within a market more routes are observed than carriers on average, indicating the presence of
multi-product firms. For each panel, the mean is calculated with each market equally weighted. Within a period t, the
mean is calculated first for each market, and then for t overall. The plots are conditional on the sample restrictions
outlined in Section 2.2.1.
2.3 Empirical Model of Demand and Oligopoly Firms
Directly modeling demand and a firm’s decision-making provides benefits for addressing the
complex role of taxes for multi-product firms in a network setting and simulating counterfactual
tax policy. I model the U.S. domestic aviation industry using a discrete-choice framework similar
to that of Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). The model is most similar to that
of Berry et al. (2006), Berry and Jia (2010), and Ciliberto and Williams (2014), who utilize these
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models to analyze the domestic U.S. aviation industry.9 These models view carriers as offering a
set of differentiated products, i.e. routes, for markets defined by their origin and destination.
I model demand using a nested logit model. Nested logit models have been used to study a
wide range of topics and industries including automobiles (Goldberg 1995; Fershtman et al. 1999),
alcohol (Slade 2004), and pharmaceutical drugs (Duso, Herr, and Suppliet 2014). Due to their
flexibility and closed-form analytical properties, they are also frequently used to inform policy
debates (Werden and Froeb 1994). Unlike the multinomial logit model, which does not allow for
consumer responses to be correlated according to a product’s characteristics, the nested logit model
allows for correlation across products in a restricted fashion predetermined by the researcher.
On the supply side, the cost for a route is the cost of segments which compose the route,
whether the route is nonstop, the characteristics of the endpoints, and an error term meant to
capture unexpected random shocks to a route’s cost. The marginal cost of a segment is a function
of the total quantity of passengers on the segment. In the airline literature, economies of scale at
the segment-level are often described as economies of density.10 Because a segment is an input to
many routes, the total quantity of passengers on a route is derived from the costs and demand of
many routes.
Carriers compete by choosing prices for their routes. A carrier’s pricing decision balances the
potential benefits of economies of scale at the segment level, the marginal cost on a route, and the
marginal revenue provided by an additional passenger.
2.3.1 Demand
A nested logit model requires the specification of mutually exclusive sets of products. I nest
products (i.e., route-carrier combinations) according to their markets as defined by the origin, final
destination, year, and quarter. The utility u of consumer i purchasing product r (i.e., a route-carrier
9Discrete-choice models have also been used to study a variety of topics in public finance. Bayer et al. (2007)
estimate a household’s willingness-to-pay for school and neighborhood attributes. Fershtman, Gandal, and Markovich
(1999) examine counterfactual tax regimes for the Israeli car market.
10Segment-level economies of scale have been well documented in the airline literature. See Brueckner and Spiller
(1994) and Berry et al. (2006) as well as citations therein for prominent examples.
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combination) in period t is
uirt = xrtβ − αpirt + ξrt + νit(σ) + (1− σ)εirt, (2.1)
where xrt is a vector of product characteristics, prt is the price for route r in period t, β captures
the taste for consumers of different characteristics, α captures consumers’ disutility from a price
increase, and ξrt represents a product characteristic unobserved to the econometrician. The term
νit is the “nested logit” random taste, which is constant across airline products and differentiates
air travel from the outside option. The outside option includes not traveling as well as driving,
taking a train, or any other non-aviation method of transit.11 The nested logit parameter σ varies
between 0 and 1, where σ = 0 reduces the model to the multinomial logit model. The σ parameter
captures substitution between flying and the outside option. The term εirt is an i.i.d. error intended
to capture idiosyncratic taste for a product. The term νit is distributed such that νit(σ) + (1−σ)εirt
has an extreme value distribution. The mean utility of the outside option is normalized to zero as
only differences in utility, not levels, are identified.
Markets are defined to be one-way travel between an origin and destination.12 Thus, a round-
trip itinerary will involve products in two markets; the outbound and return legs of the trip. As in
Berry et al. (2006), Berry and Jia (2010), and Ciliberto and Williams (2014), I define market size
as the geometric mean of the origin and destination populations.
Given the assumed structure on the error-term (Cardell 1997), for market m during period t,








11As with most discrete-choice studies, I do not observe the outside option but infer it based on the chosen market
size and observed transactions
12An alternative specification would be to expand either the set of markets or products to differentiate round-trip
from one-way travel. There are two problems with this approach. First, some carriers, such as Southwest, show up
in the data as providing only one-way tickets despite providing round-trip travel. Second, computational burden is







and Rmt is the set of routes operated in market m at time t. Conditional on purchasing a product




Thus, the model predicts qrt, product r’s market share at time t, as the probability of choosing air
travel multiplied by the probability of choosing that particular route:










Product characteristics, xrt, include the route’s distance, distance squared, an indicator if the
route is nonstop, and the number of destinations with nonstop service divided by the total numbers
of airports in the network from the origin by the carrier (i.e., the network centrality of the origin
airport). I include the origin centrality measure to capture the additional benefit from utilizing a
more dominant carrier out of an origin. Relative to prior models in the literature, this provides a
continuous and time-varying measure of whether an airport serves as a hub for a carrier. Routes
with greater origin centrality should have a marginal increase on utility for at least two reasons.
First, carriers with more destinations have more valuable frequent-flier programs due to higher
option value. Second, carriers with a large presence out of an origin may be able to provide
higher-quality service along a number of dimensions including more reliable delivery of baggage,
minimizing delays, and accommodating cancellations. Conditional on the same origin and final
destination, passengers are expected to prefer a shorter route. Similarly, passengers are expected
to derive greater utility from nonstop routes as opposed to routes with a connection.
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2.3.2 Marginal Cost





c(Qst, wst)] + ωrt,
where Qst captures the total volume of passengers of segment s at time t from any route and wst
is a vector of exogenous variables such as distance which shift costs. The term wst could include
measures of the direct cost component, such as the additional fuel cost necessary for an added
passenger. The term ωrt is a product-specific random error term and captures unexpected shocks
to marginal cost such as a shock to fuel cost which disproportionately impacts product r. I do not
impose economies of scale in the model or during estimation but specify a segment’s marginal cost,
c(Qst, wst), to be a function of the total quantity of passengers who utilize that segment across all
routes.
Segment marginal cost must be specified flexibly enough that counterfactual analysis is feasi-
ble. I utilize a spline function to capture the Qst portion of c(Qst, wst) to recover the relationship
between segment marginal cost and quantity over the support of Q. An increase in segment den-
sity,Qst, resulting in lower marginal cost provides evidence of economics of density. The complete







γwwst + γNNr + ωrt, (2.5)
where c(Qst) captures economics of density at the segment-level and takes the form
c(Qst;γs) = γ0 + γ1Qst + γ2(Qst − Q̃25)1[Qst > Q̃25] + γ3(Qst − Q̃50)1[Qst > Q̃50]
+ γ4(Qst − Q̃75)1[Qst > Q̃75],
(2.6)
where Qst refers to the quantity of passengers on segment s and Q̃25, Q̃50 and Q̃75 refer to quantity
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at the 25, 50, and 75 percentiles of the quantity CDF. The range of potential estimates for a seg-
ment’s marginal cost is unrestricted. If the parameters γ1, γ2, γ3, and γ4 = 0, then marginal cost is
constant. In equation (2.5), wst includes segment-level characteristics which impact costs such as
distance, distance squared, and centrality of the endpoints. Nr is an indicator if route r is nonstop.
Similar to the theoretical model outlined in Brueckner et al. (1992) and Agrawal et al. (2018a),
this specification follows Berry et al. (2006) by modeling a route’s marginal cost as the sum of
the marginal costs for its segments. This provides an intuitive structure in which cross-product
linkages are explicitly captured. For cost complementarities to be a relevant feature of a firm’s
profit function, products must be linked by a demand or production relationship.13 Airline products
(routes) are linked because the same flight segment (i.e., a flight from airport A to airport B)
serves as an input for multiple products or routes (A – B, A – B – C, Z – A – B, etc.). Cost
complementarities arise as the cost of operating a segment declines with more passengers due to
the use of larger, more fuel-efficient planes and the lower opportunity cost of selling a seat. Thus,
cost complementarities arise due to economies of scale at the segment level. These economies of
scale incentivize carriers to form hub-and-spoke networks which group passengers with different
origins and final destinations onto the same segment, thus driving down the cost for that segment,
while also linking products.
2.3.3 Pricing Equilibrium
Conditional on their network, carriers compete by playing a Bertrand-Nash pricing game. In











where Rct is the set of routes operated by carrier c at time t, qrt is the quantity of passengers on
route r at time t, Sct is the set of segments operated by carrier c at time t, and Qst is the total
quantity of passengers on segment s. Thus, Qst is the sum of qrt’s where s is a segment on r.
13Otherwise, then a multi-product firm’s profit function is a linear sum of the profits from individual products.
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Taxes, which are assessed both at the segment and product level, are captured by Trt. Trt is the
sum of specific taxes applied to route r at time t.
























where Rcmt is the set of routes offered by the carrier in market m and Sr is the set of segments
on route r. This first-order condition captures two key aspects the carrier is considering when
setting prices; multiple routes within a market and cost complementarities which arise because the
same segment appears on multiple routes. First, because routes within a market are substitutes,
a change in the price of r is assumed to directly affect demand for other routes in the market,
some of which the carrier may operate. As with any multi-product firm, the carrier accounts for
the change in profits to its other routes based on the derived substitution patterns specified by the
underlying demand system. This could potentially mitigate or amplify price changes relative to a
single-product firm. Second, the marginal cost of a route is in part the sum of the marginal cost for
each segment on the route. As specified in section 2.3.2, I allow the marginal cost of a segment to
be a function of passenger quantity. As a carrier adjusts a route’s fare this will affect the quantity
of passengers on that route’s segments and thus the segment’s marginal cost. All segments appear
in multiple routes. As their marginal costs change, this affects the underlying pricing decision for
other routes. The carrier accounts for these cost spillovers as well.
2.4 Estimation
I jointly estimate demand and supply via GMM. Modeling utility and marginal costs provides
two sets of moment conditions, one for each of the structural error terms on a route. Letting Zd be
the set of demand instruments, demand moments take the form
E[∆ξrt(θd)Zd] = 0,
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where θd is the vector of demand parameters to be estimated. Similarly, supply moments take the
form
E[∆ωrt(θs)Zs] = 0,
where θs is the vector of supply parameters to be estimated and Zs the set of supply instruments.
For demand moments, I model the error term from equation (2.1) as ξrt = ξm + ξc + ξt + ∆ξrt
where fixed effects are captured by ξm for market, ξc for carrier, and ξt for time fixed effects. Given
my model, the demand error term is
∆ξrt = δrt − αprt − xrtβ − ξm − ξc − ξt, (2.7)
with δrt the predicted mean utility for the nested logit derived in Berry (1994).
For supply moments, I model the error term from equation (2.5) as ωrt = ωc + ωo + ωd + ωt +
∆ωrt where supply-side fixed effects are ωc for carrier, ωo for origin, ωd for destination, and ωt for
time period. The supply error term is






γwst − γ7Nr − ωc − ωo − ωd − ωt. (2.8)
Let gd and gs be the demand-side and supply-side moments respectively:
gd = E[∆ξZd] = 0,
gs = E[∆ωZs] = 0,
where ∆ξ and ∆ω are defined by equations 2.7 and 2.8, respectively.
Let G(θd, θs) be the stacked set of moments (gd, gs) where θd = [α,β, ξm, ξc, ξt] includes
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demand-side parameters and fixed effects and θs = [γ, ωc, ωo, ωd, ωt] includes supply-side param-
eters and fixed effects. Thus, I estimate θ = (θd, θs) by minimizing
Q(θ) = G(θ)′W−1G(θ),
where W is an efficient weighting matrix defined as W = E[Z ′GG′Z]. See Appendix A.1.1 for
greater details for a simple network.
2.4.1 Instruments
As in Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995), estimation of the model exploits the fact that
at the true parameter values the structural errors of the model, ξ and ω, are orthogonal to the
vector of instruments.14 I require instruments for all endogenous variables which enter the model:
fares, within-market shares, and segment quantities. Endogeneity is caused by an omitted variable,
product quality. The panel structure of my data allows me to use a rich set of fixed effects to
control for unobserved heterogeneity and ease endogeneity concerns. Carrier fixed effects capture
time-invariant aspects of quality as well as network structure which could impact costs. Market
fixed effects reflect heterogeneity in the degree of business travel between cities as well as the
necessity of air travel as they absorb the distance between the two airports. Origin and destination
fixed effects capture factors such as landing fees, likelihood of runway congestion, and physical
infrastructure which often do not vary even over long panels. Time fixed effects flexibly control
for changes in the macroeconomic environment such as recessions which impact both prices and
passenger volume. On the supply side, they capture industry-wide cost factors such as fuel prices
which are largely set at the national level.
Even given the specified fixed effects, fares could be correlated with unobserved aspects of
product quality which are assumed to be known to passengers, such as the time of day for a flight
or aircraft amenities. I also require an instrument for the parameter σ which is estimated using a
route’s share of air travel in a market at time t and endogenous due to the relationship between
14This orthogonality condition, E(ξZ) = E(ωZ) = 0, is conceptually equivalent to the exogeneity requirement
for estimation of any linear instrumental variable models. For example, see equation (5.8) in Wooldridge (2010) for
the single equation case.
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price and quantity. Instruments must be correlated with the share of air travel the route receives but
uncorrelated with the utility of the product. On the supply side, the segment quantities in equation
(2.6) are endogenous and require instruments as well.
My instruments fall into two broad categories; taxes and rival characteristics of other products
within the market. Taxes can be considered classic cost-shifters, shifting a route’s marginal cost
curve without affecting the underlying non-pecuniary elements of utility. Conceptually, I can trace
out a demand curve by observing fares and quantities both initially and following a change in
taxes. As with any exogenous variation, identification is strongest for the range of prices where
tax changes are observed. Assumptions on functional form (i.e., the nested logit) play a larger role
for portions of the demand curve outside the range of observed price changes. Tax instruments
include the U.S. Ticket Tax rate, the total PFC, total segment tax, Sept. 11th Security Fees, and
the Alaska-Hawaii ticket tax. Taxes can be used to identify both supply and demand elasticities in
some contexts (Zoutman, Gavrilova, and Hopland 2018); I utilize taxes as an instrument for the
after-tax fare and thus implicitly to recover demand elasticities as well as on the supply side to
recover supply elasticities.
Rival product characteristics and functions of rival product characteristics, such as the num-
ber of other carriers offering nonstop service or an indicator if a rival offers nonstop service, are
common instruments in the IO literature. The intuition for these instruments is characteristics of
rival products impact the price a firm can charge, and hence market share, but do not affect the
underlying utility or marginal cost for a product. Instead, they shift the markup a firm can charge
over marginal cost. These instruments may be rich as the closeness of products in characteristic
space directly impacts the ability of a firm to charge higher prices. If a rival is offering a highly
similar product, for example a nonstop flight with a similar departure time, then the firm is forced
to price closer to marginal cost, while the utility derived from the flight for a passenger is not
affected by the other flight. The set of potential instruments is large. For example, it includes
the presence of rival products in the market, the quality of rival products, indicators for particular
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characteristics, and measures of the scope and scale of competition.15 My set of rival characteristic
instruments includes the number of rival carriers offering nonstop service, an indicator if any rival
offers nonstop service, the number of rival products, an indicator for monopoly markets and the
total number of carriers operating in the market. Finally, I include instruments derived from the
interaction of instruments in both categories; the passenger-weighted mean tax faced by rival car-
riers within the market and an interaction between the monopoly indicator and specific taxes on a
route. The monopoly indicator varies across time, while the remaining tax and rival characteristic
instruments vary across products within a market and across time.16
Valid instruments must satisfy the standard econometric conditions. First, instruments must
be correlated with the endogenous variables: prices, within-market shares, and segment quantities.
Second, instruments need to be uncorrelated with the structural error terms ∆ξrt and ∆ωrt, or more
generally the unobserved portion of utility and marginal cost. Alternatively stated, instruments
need to be uncorrelated with any omitted variable which explains utility or marginal cost. Although
many studies without data on product-level taxes, such as Dubois, Griffith, and O’Connell (2017)
and Griffith et al. (2018), can pursue similar empirical approaches to address tax policy questions
by exploiting consumer responses to price changes, the exogeneity of taxes and their variation at
the product level make them especially valuable as instruments in this setting.
With respect to relevance, utilizing the estimating equation derived for nested logit demand in
15As with any instrument or set of instruments, an essentially infinite number of instruments can be created via
functional form transformations and interactions. To avoid a weak instruments problem, I limit myself to a select set
of linear instruments.
16Cost-shifters and rival characteristics are common instruments in the airline literature for prices, quantities, and
within-market share. Berry et al. (2006) use characteristics of route endpoints as instruments. Berry and Jia (2010)
instrument using the percentage of rival routes with nonstop flights, the average distance of rival routes, the number
of rival routes within a market, the number of carriers in a market, indicators if a destination or connecting airport is
a hub, and the 25th and 75th quantiles of route characteristics. Ciliberto and Williams (2014) use unique data on gate
access at airports. Gayle (2007) uses the number of own-products within a market, number of rival products, number
of products with an equivalent number of stops, and average price in other markets. Other than average price, these
instruments are either cost-shifters or shift a firm’s markup over marginal cost. The tax data allow me to use a more
parsimonious and thus efficient set of instruments. Beyond this paper, taxes are likely to be useful for any study of the
aviation industry in which endogeneity of fares is a concern.
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Berry (1994), I test the set of instruments predict the endogenous variables and reject the null hy-
pothesis of weak instruments.17 Beyond the formal test, where rejection should be interpreted cau-
tiously, economic theory and intuition suggest little reason to suspect weak instruments. Standard
theories of incidence predict that taxes impact prices except under a narrow set of circumstances
such as perfectly elastic demand. Further, empirical studies of incidence have frequently found
substantial pass-through, if not over-shifting in many instances (Poterba 1996; Besley and Rosen
1999; Kenkel 2005). Agrawal et al. (2018a) provide evidence aviation taxes influence a route’s
price as well as the prices of routes linked within a carrier’s network.
The exclusion restriction is inherently more difficult to justify, but there are a number of reasons
to be optimistic about why taxes and rival characteristics qualify. First, rival characteristics are
unlikely to directly enter the utility or marginal cost for a route. For example, other than observed
changes in price, the utility a passenger receives by flying nonstop is unaffected by the presence
of another nonstop flight by a different carrier. More generally, flights with closer substitutes are
likely to have lower prices without changing a passenger’s willingness to pay. Similarly, taxes
are also unlikely to be correlated with unobserved determinants of demand or cost for at least
two reasons. First, they are assessed at either the airport or the national level while demand and
cost are driven by route-level considerations. Second, they are assessed for long periods of time,
require a lengthy bureaucratic process to be implemented (see Figure 2.8 for a flowchart from
the FAA describing the timing of implementation), and as noted in Table 2.3 often expire at the
national level due to unrelated difficulty by Congress in agreeing to a budget. More generally, the
included controls and rich set of fixed effects absorb much of the unobserved heterogeneity in the
demand and cost equations. The remaining portions of the error terms are difficult to predict, and,
as Berry and Jia (2010) highlight, many of the elements which constitute ∆ξrt and ∆ωrt such as
gate locations, aircraft fleets, etc. are exogenous in the short run.
17Following Stock and Yogo (2005), I use the Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic, the analog of the Cragg-Donald
statistic for equations with robust standard errors, to test and reject the null. Less formally, the F-statistic for the
first-stage regression is substantially larger than 10, the rule of thumb suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).
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Figure 2.8: PFC Implementation
Note:This is a flowchart describing the negotiations between airports, carriers, and the FAA required to implement a
PFC. It is taken from the Department of Transportation’s handbook on Passenger Facility Charges, FAA Order
5500.1, Passenger Facility Charge guidance (2001)
2.5 Results
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present parameter estimates of the model. Coefficients have the anticipated
sign. On the demand side, higher prices, all else equal, are associated with lower utility. The nested
logit parameter σ is between zero and one, a necessary condition for demand curves consistent
with standard utility theory. It is also statistically different from zero, indicating a multinomial
logit model would be inappropriate. The parameter governs substitution to the outside option,
with greater values correlated with greater substitution to within-nest options. In my model, the
relatively high value of .73 indicates most consumers substitute to other forms of air travel given
a fare increase. Nonstop routes provide additional utility. Longer routes within a market provide
less utility. They do so at a diminishing rate (which does not turn positive over any relevant range
of miles). Finally, flying out of an airport with greater centrality, where a carrier has more nonstop
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destinations, provides greater utility. This is consistent with what other studies have found and
generally attributed to improved service and increased benefits of loyalty programs. While it is
generally more difficult to gauge if the magnitudes of the coefficients are appropriate, the price
coefficient implies an elasticity of 1.71 for the median market. Berry and Jia (2010) report similar
elasticity estimates of 1.55 in 1999 and 1.67 in 2006.

















Note: This table reports the demand parameters specified in equation (2.1). The fare (α) and σ parameters govern
price sensitivity and substitution to the outside option. Nonstop is an indicator equal to one if a route does not use a
connecting airport. Distance refers to the number of miles flown on the route and is per 1000 miles. Origin Centrality
is defined as the share of destinations served nonstop by a carrier out of the origin. The specification includes carrier,
market (i.e., origin-destination), and time (year-quarter) fixed effects. Positive values indicate greater indirect utility
as the characteristic increases. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are calculated by
bootstrapping with block resampling at the market-time level.
The predicted marginal cost and markups from the model are consistent with the prior literature.
The average marginal cost is $164 and the average markup, defined as
prt −mcrt
mcrt
, is .52. Each
of the estimates is within the range of reported estimates in Berry and Jia (2010). All else equal,
an additional 1,000 miles adds $89 to a flight.18 The estimated spline function c(Qs) describes
changes in marginal cost of a segment as more passengers are added to a segment. I find evidence
18A thousand miles is approximately the distance of a flight from Boston to St. Louis.
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Note: This table reports the marginal cost parameters specified in Equation (2.5). Distance refers to the number of
miles flown on the route and is per 1000 miles. Nonstop is an indicator equal to one if a route does not use a
connecting airport. The set of γ parameters corresponds to the linear spline specification in equation (2.6). The
specification includes carrier, origin, destination, and time (year-quarter) fixed effects. Positive values indicate
increased route marginal cost. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with block resampling at the
market-time level.
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for economies of scale, and thus cost complementarities. Economies of scale level off for segments
with greater density. To illustrate, Figure 2.9 displays the marginal cost of a thousand-mile segment
for the 4th quarter of 2015. The marginal cost starts at approximately $190 but declines rapidly
before leveling off around $160 for routes in the largest quartile.
Figure 2.9: Segment Marginal Cost and Quantity
Note: This figure illustrates the marginal cost for a thousand-mile segment in the 4th quarter of 2015 as the quantity
on the segment increases. A thousand miles is approximately the mean distance traveled by passengers on a route. It
utilizes parameter estimates from Table 2.5 to illustrate the linear spline specification detailed in equation (2.6). The
plot is conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1.
2.6 Tax Simulation and Counterfactuals
One of the primary benefits of a structural approach is the ability to simulate alternative tax
policies. Section 2.6.1 provides an overview of how I solve for optimal prices given a change in
tax policy. In section 2.6.2, I begin by demonstrating that the intuition from theoretical network
models and empirical results such as those in Agrawal et al. (2018a) has not been compromised by
the structure or assumptions made during estimation. I then review the primary predictions on how
cost complementarities impact pass-through and incidence on both taxed and untaxed routes. Next,
in section 2.6.3, I suggest alternative revenue-neutral tax policies, including those which exploit
cost complementarities by subsidizing hubs.
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2.6.1 Solving for Optimal Prices
The proposal of any alternative tax schedule requires firms to reoptimize. To find the new set
of equilibrium prices, I search for the new set of equilibrium prices using the first-order conditions.
Specifically, I search for a fixed point which satisfies
q(p) + (∆. ∗M)p− (∆. ∗M) (S ∗mc(q(p))s + T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
mcr
= 0 (2.9)




, as defined by the demand model, M is an indicator matrix (to be multiplied
point-wise) if products are in the same market and operated by the same firm, p is the vector of
route fares, S is the route by segment matrix of indicators for if the marginal cost of a segment
is impacted, mc(q)s is the vector of segment marginal costs, which are a function of q, T is the
vector of specific taxes on a route and mcr equals the vector of route marginal costs. There is no
guarantee that a fixed point exists or that it is unique. However, for the fixed point I find, I confirm
second-order conditions hold at equilibrium prices p∗. I then use p∗ to calculate predicted shares,
quantities, consumer surplus, and any other equilibrium values. Appendix A.1.1 provides more
explicit details for a simple network.
2.6.2 Tax Simulations
Even in simple theoretical models with cost complementarities and multi-product firms, taxa-
tion has ambiguous effects on prices, quantities, and the distribution of welfare. This ambiguity
arises along two dimensions: direct incidence, the change in prices and welfare on taxed products,
and indirect incidence, or changes in prices and welfare on untaxed products. Also, various factors
such as the centrality of an airport might mitigate or amplify changes in direct or indirect incidence.
In terms of direct incidence, a tax on a particular route causes some passengers to substitute
either to not flying or to other routes. The decline in passengers increases the marginal cost of
segments on the route, which leads to higher prices. To partially capture the effect on direct
incidence, I use the parameters from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 to compare prices in a network without
taxes to a network in which every route is taxed $1. I find taxes are on average over-shifted, as
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tax-inclusive prices increase by $1.04 on average. Over-shifting of taxes is consistent with cost
complementarities, but can also arise due to the curvature of demand or competitive responses in
imperfect markets (Weyl and Fabinger 2013).
In addition to the direct effect, network tax models predict ambiguous changes in indirect
incidence due to the multi-product nature of firms and substitution to alternative routes. First,
the same segment appearing in multiple routes connects their marginal costs, even if one route
is not taxed. Consider two routes, operated by the same carrier, which share a segment: the
first originates in Boston, flies to Philadelphia, and has a final destination of Atlanta; the second
originates in Detroit, flies to Philadelphia, and has a final destination of Atlanta. Thus, the two
routes share an input, the flight segment from Philadelphia to Atlanta. A tax on enplanements in
Boston will directly impact the first route but not the second. The Boston tax decreases passengers
on the Boston to Atlanta route and thus decreases the number of passengers on the Philadelphia
to Atlanta segment. The decline in passengers increases the marginal cost of the segment, which
causes the price of the Detroit to Atlanta route to increase.
A second cause of indirect incidence arises from substitution to other routes in the same market,
including routes offered by rival carriers. Consider two connecting routes offered by rival carri-
ers in the same Baltimore to Houston market: Baltimore to Atlanta to Houston with Delta, and
Baltimore to Charlotte to Houston with American Airlines. A tax on Atlanta enplanements will
increase the marginal cost of the Atlanta to Houston segment, increase the Delta route’s price, and
shift marginal passengers from Delta to American. This lowers the cost of both American Airlines
segments, lowers the price of that route, and lowers the price of other routes where those segments
serve as an input. This example also highlights the possibility of price decreases on untaxed routes.
Empirically, the presence of indirect incidence, whether positive or negative, is clear. Figure
2.10 shows the mean direct and indirect effect when enplanements out of each airport are taxed
individually and other segments remain untaxed. I measure indirect incidence by the mean change
in price on all routes which do not have a segment originating in the taxed airport. To construct this
figure, I simulate 150 tax scenarios, one for each airport in the sample, comparing before-tax and
after-tax prices. For example, a $1 tax on all Atlanta enplanements leads to an average increase in
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price of 1.3 cents for passengers on routes without an Atlanta enplanement. While non-taxed fares
often increase, fares decrease on untaxed routes for a substantial number of airports, as captured
by the mass below 0 in panel (b).
Figure 2.10: Distribution of Direct and Indirect Incidence
(a) Direct (b) Indirect
Note: Panel A and Panel B respectively depict the distribution of the mean direct and mean indirect change in prices
from a $1 tax on enplanements at each airport when all other airports are untaxed. To construct this figure, I simulate
150 tax scenarios, one for each airport in the sample, comparing before-tax and after-tax prices. The figure is
conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1 and parameters in Section 2.5.
The third result is that indirect incidence is greater out of more central airports, or hubs, than
spoke airports. Indirect incidence occurs consistently across airports but varies in systematic ways.
Notably, hubs or airports with greater centrality are predicted to exhibit greater indirect effects. A
tax on enplanements at hubs impacts more passengers and segments, resulting in greater indirect
incidence. Figure 2.12 maps the relationship between airport centrality and indirect incidence from
a $1 tax on enplanements at each airport when all other airports are untaxed. Each dot represents
one of the 150 airports included in the sample. The size corresponds to the airport’s centrality.
A larger dot indicates a more centrally connected airport. The color corresponds to the sign and
magnitude of the mean indirect incidence. Blue dots indicate negative indirect incidence. Red dots
indicate positive indirect incidence. More intense colors indicate greater magnitudes. In general,
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larger dots are a deeper shade of red. This is clearest for major hubs such as Atlanta, Dallas-
Fort Worth, and Chicago O’Hare. Panel A in Figure 2.11 provides an alternative visualization by
plotting indirect incidence as airport centrality changes from the exercise in separately taxing each
airport. In panel B, I plot the change in consumer surplus and origin centrality for each airport
from a $1 tax increase on enplanements.
Figure 2.11: Centrality and Incidence
(a) Indirect Incidence and Airport Centrality (b) Consumer Surplus Change and Airport Centrality
Note: Panel (a) charts the mean indirect incidence and airport centrality from a $1 tax on enplanements at each
airport when all other airports are untaxed. Panel (b) depicts the corresponding change in consumer surplus. Indirect
incidence is defined as the change in prices from all routes which are not taxed. For a given airport, centrality is the
share of airports with nonstop flights from the given airport. To construct this figure, I simulate 150 tax scenarios, one
for each airport in the sample, comparing before-tax and after-tax prices. The figure is conditional on the sample
restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1 and parameters in Section 2.5.
2.6.3 Counterfactuals
Universal Tax
In many settings, consumer welfare is improved by imposing a lump-sum tax or eliminating
spatial distortions in taxes.19 In a network setting with cost complementarities, consumers may
gain little from setting universal taxes when tax reforms are constrained to be revenue neutral.
Table 2.6 provides a comparison between current tax policy, eliminating taxes, and collecting the
19See Fajgelbaum et al. (2018) and Agrawal and Foremny (2019) for recent examples on the role of spatially
distorted taxes.
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Figure 2.12: Indirect Incidence and Airport Centrality
Note: This figure projects the relationship between indirect incidence and airport centrality from a $1 tax on
enplanements at each airport when all other airports are untaxed. Each dot represents one of the 150 airports included
in the sample. The size corresponds to the airport’s centrality. Larger indicates a more centrally connected airport.
The color corresponds to the sign and magnitude of the mean indirect incidence. Blue dots indicate negative indirect
incidence. Red dots indicate positive indirect incidence. More intense colors indicate greater magnitudes. The map is
an alternative visualization of panel (a) in Figure 2.11.
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same total tax revenue via either a uniform route or uniform segment tax. Under current tax policy
for the final quarter in my sample, the fourth quarter of 2015, the average tax per passenger is
$17.67, the average tax per route is $21.87, and the average tax per segment flown is $12.39.
Holding revenue constant, standardizing taxes per route results in a tax of $17.65 per route and an
increase in consumer surplus of .2%. Alternatively, standardizing taxes per segment results in a tax
of $12.50 per segment and essentially no change in consumer surplus. One reason passengers do
not experience greater welfare changes from eliminating tax variation is current tax policy largely
treats routes equivalently, especially when they have the same number of segments. Variation in
tax treatment across routes has declined as airports imposed the maximum PFC. By the end of the
sample period, nearly all airports assessed the maximum allowable charge of $4.50.
Table 2.6: Counterfactual Policy Comparison
Universal
Tax Policy: Current No Taxes $17.65 per route $12.47 per segment
Tax Revenue 1.0 0 1.0 1.0
Consumer Surplus 1.0 1.053 1.002 0.999
Total Quantity 1.0 1.052 1.002 0.999
Nonstop Passengers 1.0 1.025 0.976 1.012
Connecting Passengers 1.0 1.090 1.036 0.982
Total miles flown 1.0 1.064 1.012 0.998
Note: This table summarizes the impact of different tax policies on total consumer surplus, the total quantity of
passengers, the total number of nonstop and connecting passengers, and the total number of miles flown. For any row,
1.0 is equivalent to current policy.
While consumer welfare changes are minimal, Table 2.6 highlights the incentives taxes have on
the type of routes passengers utilize. Relative to current policy, which utilizes a mix of route and
segment taxes, a universal route tax eliminates an incentive to minimize the number of segments
on an itinerary. Thus, while total quantity is largely unchanged, 3.6% more passengers travel
via connecting as opposed to nonstop routes. Alternatively, a universal segment tax results in a
1.2% increase in nonstop passengers relative to current policy. Also, while a universal segment tax
slightly reduces total distance, a route tax will increase the total number of miles flown by 1.2%.
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Incorporating Cost Complementarities into Tax Policy
Given the presence of cost complementarities, a universal tax is not the optimal policy. As
Figure 2.11 indicates, greater welfare gains might be realized from subsidizing hubs, where the
marginal impact on consumer welfare is largest. Figure 2.13 illustrates the effect of an alternative
policy in which non-hub segments are taxed at the revenue-neutral rate of $12.47 per segment,
while segments departing from one of the ten most central airports (i.e., hubs) are taxed at a per-
centage of the universal tax. From left to right, the figure depicts no subsidization, where all
segments are subject to the revenue-neutral universal tax of $12.50, to 100% subsidization, where
enplanements at hubs are untaxed. Subsidizing leads to consumer welfare gains but also declines
in tax revenue. When the ten largest hubs are fully subsidized, consumer welfare increases by
1.6% and tax revenue declines to 70% of current revenues.
Figure 2.13 depicts a tax policy which transfers tax revenue to consumers. Cost complemen-
tarities provide the possibility to subsidize hubs, and improve welfare, while raising an equivalent
amount of tax revenue. Figure 2.14 depicts the change in consumer surplus from a revenue-neutral
subsidy for the ten airports with greatest network centrality (i.e., hubs). The increase in consumer
surplus is relative to consumer surplus generated by setting a universal revenue-neutral segment
tax. Subsidization requires a substantial increase in the tax rate applied to enplanements on non-
hub segments. Under full subsidization, every non-hub segments is assessed a tax of $18.50.
Competing Effects on Prices
The small increase in consumer welfare from hub subsidies is partially due to ambiguous price
effects. This is most clear when one examines a tax on enplanements at a single airport and the
impact of that tax on a subset of fares. Figure 2.15 depicts for the 4th quarter of 2015 how a $1 tax
on enplanements at Atlanta changes fares in markets where Atlanta serves as a connecting airport,
even if a route is not itself taxed. Panel (a) illustrates the distribution of fare changes for directly
taxed routes (i.e., RDU to ATL to LAX), while panel (b) illustrates the distribution of fare changes
for untaxed routes (i.e., RDU to DFW to LAX). There are 81,796 routes in markets where Atlanta
is a connecting airport. Of those routes, 11,332 connect via Atlanta and are directly taxed, while
70,464 have the same origin and final destination of a taxed route but are not directly taxed. For
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Figure 2.13: Consumer Surplus and Hub Subsidy: Declining Revenue
Note: This figure illustrates the increase in consumer welfare and tax revenue relative to current policy when
enplanements at the ten most central airports are subject to a lower tax rate. Enplanements at non-hub segments are
subject to the revenue-neutral universal tax of $12.50 per passenger. To construct this figure, for each of the
subsidized tax rates, I find the new set of profit-maximizing prices and calculate total consumer surplus and total tax
revenue. The figure is conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1 and parameters in Section 2.5.
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Figure 2.14: Consumer Surplus and Hub Subsidy: Revenue-Neutral
Note: This figure illustrates the increase in consumer welfare when enplanements at the ten most central airports are
subject to a lower tax rate. Improvement in consumer welfare is graphed on the left axis and the non-hub tax rate is
graphed on the right axis. Enplanements at non-hub segments are subject to a revenue-neutral tax, which increases to
offset the subsidy. To construct this figure, for each of the subsidized tax rates, I find the revenue-neutral tax to apply
to non-hub segments by starting at a low tax and slowly increasing until tax-revenue is unchanged. For each iteration
of subsidy and non-hub tax rate, I find the new set of profit-maximizing prices, calculate total consumer surplus, and
total tax revenue. The figure is conditional on the sample restrictions outlined in Section 2.2.1 and parameters in
Section 2.5.
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directly taxed routes, a $1 tax increases prices by approximately 97 cents on average. Further,
46% of routes experience over-shifting or an increase in price greater than the tax. For untaxed
routes, a $1 tax increases prices by 2.7 cents per route. In terms of heterogeneity, 33.6% see fares
decline while 66.4% of untaxed fares increase. In my model, declines in fare are attributable to cost
complementarities, which lower cost as passengers substitute to alternative routes. Fare increases
on untaxed routes are a strategic response to the price increase of a substitutable product. These
competing prices effects, which are similar across airports, partially negate many of the potential
welfare gains from hub subsidization.
Figure 2.15: Distribution of Fare Changes
(a) Taxed Routes (b) Untaxed Routes
Note: The figure above illustrates the distribution of fare changes from a $1 tax on enplanements at Atlanta for the
4th quarter of 2015 in markets where Atlanta serves as a connecting airport. Panel (a) charts the distribution of fare
changes for directly taxed routes. Panel (b) charts the distribution of fare changes for untaxed routes. In total, 81,796
routes are in markets where Atlanta is a connecting airport with 11,332 connecting via Atlanta and the remaining
70,464 sharing the same origin and final destination. In panel (a), $1 tax increases prices on taxed routes by
approximately 97 cents on average, with 46% experiencing over-shifting. In panel (b), fares increase by 2.7 cents per
route, with 33.6% of untaxed fares declining and 66.4% of untaxed fares increasing.
Despite these competing effects, carriers have substantial interest in a tax on any given airport,
especially taxes on more centrally located airports within their networks. Further, a tax on an
airport is likely to generate a distinct range of responses across carriers. Figure 2.16 plots fare
and quantity changes from a $1 tax on enplanements at Atlanta for the 4th quarter of 2015 in
markets where Atlanta serves as a connecting airport. Panel (a) graphs changes for directly taxed
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routes. Panel (b) graphs changes for untaxed routes. In order to illustrate how different carriers
at the same airport might respond differently to a tax, Delta’s routes are in blue, while all other
carriers are indicated in red. On average a $1 tax increase prices by approximately $1 but Delta
passes through a tax at a rate substantially less than one. Delta internalizes passengers are likely to
substitute to routes operated by rivals and experience smaller cost increases because their Atlanta
routes are on average more densely populated. In panel (b), illustrating untaxed routes, where Delta
generally has more sparsely populated routes, they are more likely to lower prices as their marginal
cost declines. Other carriers, which were competing primarily with Delta’s Atlanta routes, are
incentivized to increase prices in equilibrium.
Figure 2.16: Heterogeneity in Carrier Response
(a) Taxed Routes (b) Untaxed Routes
Note: The figures above plot fare and quantity changes from a $1 tax on enplanements at Atlanta for the 4th quarter
of 2015 in markets where Atlanta serves as a connecting airport. Panel (a) graphs changes for directly taxed routes.
Panel (b) graphs changes for untaxed routes. In order to illustrate how different carriers at the same airport might
respond differently to a tax, Delta’s routes are blue, while all other carriers are indicated in red.
2.7 Conclusion
I study how the linkages between a firm’s products impact the magnitude and distribution of
incidence spatially within a network and across products. In nearly every industry, firms structure
their product offerings to optimally respond to demand and cost considerations. Despite this, rel-
atively little work has been done to better understand how connections between a firm’s products
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impact the welfare burden of taxes and the efficiency of raising revenue. Theoretical results (Edge-
worth 1925; Coase 1946) have long emphasized the wide range of potential incidence outcomes
from taxation of multi-product firms. These results established the need for empirical estimates
to address questions regarding how factors such as cost complementarities, which link products,
influence cross-product incidence, what characteristics of products impact incidence, and how tax
policy should be adjusted to account for these factors.
To explore these and other questions, I develop a discrete-choice oligopoly model where profit-
maximizing firms compete by choosing prices. In choosing prices, a firm accounts for both substi-
tution to other products it owns and how changes in price affect the cost of potentially many prod-
ucts. I examine a network setting, the U.S. domestic aviation industry, where connections between
a firm’s products are observed and cost complementarities between products are well-established
both theoretically and empirically. I estimate the model using the Data Bank 1B (DB1B) of the
U.S Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey for the years 1993 through
2015 and the tax calculator from Agrawal et al. (2018b), which decomposes the reported fare into
taxes and the base fare set by the carrier.
The key fact for my model, as well as prior models of the industry, is that the marginal cost
for operating a flight segment declines over a relevant range of equilibrium quantities. This fact,
combined with the same segment appearing on multiple routes, leads to at least three notable com-
parative statics on the relationship between taxes and incidence across the network. First, relative
to a world without cost complementarities, price will increase by a larger amount (i.e., pass-through
will be greater) on the taxed route. This incidence, which I refer to as direct incidence, is greater
because passengers substituting to other routes or to not flying increases the marginal costs for the
segments composing the route. Second, incidence on untaxed routes, or indirect incidence, is im-
pacted by taxes elsewhere in the network. For example, routes which share segments will see their
marginal cost increase. Third, more central airports or hubs will see larger indirect effects due to
their role within the network. In my empirical analysis, I find evidence for all of these comparative
statics. Incorporating these findings, I propose counterfactual tax policies which mimic the cur-
rent tax structure but adjust taxes according to the centrality of a route’s airports. The alternative
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revenue-neutral tax policy leads to an increase in consumer welfare.
While my research speaks directly to potential improvements in U.S. aviation tax policy, more
broadly I provide insight on the role of firms’ strategic response to taxes and the at times conflicting
incentives between local tax authorities, who fail to internalize price changes in other markets, and
federal tax authorities responsible for the financial health of the industry as a whole. This situation
is not dissimilar from the misalignment of incentives in models between individual agents and
a social planner. As in the aviation industry, tax policy often arises in an ad-hoc fashion out of
legislation to address particular concerns. A comprehensive assessment of the cumulative effects
of those policies and their interaction with important institutional details offers the possibility of
welfare-improving reforms.
A number of topics and issues are not addressed by my model or empirical results, and are
thus left for future research. First, a more flexible demand system than nested logit, especially
one which more fully captures the curvature of demand, would allow greater decomposition of the
relative weight of incidence attributed to competitive or market-level factors and factors such as
cost complementarities. Second, while I assume a fixed network structure, a model of firm entry
and the evolution of the network would provide valuable insight into long-term incidence factors.
Finally, I exploit the exogeneity of PFC timing in the short term, but an explicit model of local tax






For illustrative purpose and to aid in explicitly laying out the estimation procedure, I present
a model of a diamond network as depicted in Figure A.1 similar to that found in Brueckner et al.
(1992) and Agrawal et al. (2018a). In this model, airports A and B are connected via two hubs
H1 and H2. The hubs are connected via a nonstop connection. All travel is assumed to take the
shortest route. I assume a monopoly carrier serves the entire network. It is straightforward to add
additional carriers.
Figure A.1: Network Structure
For notational simplicity, I consider only non-directional round-trip markets defined by the end-
points. Thus, passengers traveling from A to B round-trip and passengers traveling B to A round-
trip are in the same market. Given the network structure, six markets exist: A to H1, A to H2, B to
H1, B toH2,H1 toH2, and A to B. Given these markets and the assumption on travel, the full set of
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routes Rc for carrier c is composed of routes rj where j ∈ {ah1, ah2, bh1, bh2, ah1b, ah2b, h1h2}.
There are seven routes because market A to B includes two potential routes, capturing connection
via either hub. For one-stop routes in the A to B market, the connecting hub is noted in between a
and b. In this network, the set of segments Sc operated by c is composed of five segments sk where
k ∈ {AH1, AH2, BH1, BH2, H1H2}. The carrier will choose a price pr for each route which will
result in a quantity of passengers qr on each route. These quantities are inputs into the costs for















Assuming changes in prices affect only other products within a market yields a first-order
condition for each of the routes:
60






















































































For convenience in discussing the estimation procedure, I specify the first-order conditions in
matrix notation:
q + (∆. ∗M)p− (∆. ∗M) (S ∗mcs + T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
mcr
= 0 (A.1)
where q is an |Rc| x 1 vector of shares, ∆ is the |Rc| x |Rc| matrix of
∂qkt
∂prt
as defined by the
demand model, M is the |Rc| x |Rc| indicator matrix (to be multiplied point-wise) if products are
in the same market and operated by the same firm, p is the |Rc| x 1 vector of fares, S is the |Rc| x
|Sc|matrix of indicators for if the marginal cost of segment is impacted,mcs is the |Sct| x 1 vector
of segment marginal costs, T is the |Rc| x 1 vector of specific taxes on a route andmcr is the |Rct|
x 1 vector of route marginal costs.
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In application, q and p are constructed from data. Similarly, the ownership matrix M is ob-
served. The most complicated to construct is S, but one can recover route marginal cost without
it. Still, S can be observed and has an intuitive structure. Each column represents a segment. An
element of 1 indicates product r has a direct impact on the marginal cost of that segment. Each row
represents a product. An element of 1 indicates the segments which compose the product. Thus,
the first column in S captures the segment AH1. Given this market structure, the two products
which are inputs into the marginal cost of AH1 are ah1 and ah1b. The first row captures the prod-
uct ah1. Segment AH1 is the only segment for ah1 and thus a 1 appears only for the first column.
For a connecting route such as ah1b, captured by the fifth row and composed of segments AH1 and
BH1, a one appears in the first and third columns corresponding to their respective columns.
A.1.2 Estimation
Estimation exploits the fact that at the true parameter values the error terms are uncorrelated
with the instruments, i.e.,E[∆ξZd] = E[∆ωZs] = 0. Modeling utility and marginal costs provides
two sets of moment conditions, one for each of the error terms on a route. The terms ∆ξ and ∆ω
are defined by the model laid out in section 2.3. Explicitly, θ, the full set of parameters, is chosen
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where Zd and Zs are r x zd and r x zs matrices
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The nested logit framework provides an analytical solution for the mean utility δ such that for
a given route δ = ln(qr)− σln(q̄r/m)− ln(q0) where qr is the route’s market share, q̄r/m is route’s
share of passengers choosing air travel, and q0 is the share of the outside option. The marginal cost
for a given route is defined by taking the log of the inversion of the firm’s first-order conditions, as
laid out in equation (A.1). Explicitly, it is mc = ln(pr − (∆. ∗M)−1qr) where ∆ is defined by the
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q̄r′/m + qr′) if r 6= r′ and r and r′ in same nest
0 if r 6= r′ and r and r′ in different nests
The third row’s specification that substitution between nests equals zero is a direct consequence
of the assumption passengers do not shift across markets when price changes. In other words,
an increase in the price of a route between New York and Los Angeles will not cause a potential
passenger to shift their travel plans to New York to Miami. They may still choose to not fly. This
assumption is violated for a subset of consumers, especially tourists, but is necessary to make
computation feasible.
To recover parameters, I perform a non-linear search over the terms linking supply and demand,
α and σ, and recover the remaining linear parameters via two-staged least squares. Specifically,




































xrt vector of route characteristics for r in period t
prt fare (price) for route r in period t
β parameter vector of consumer preferences
α fare coefficient
ξrt unobserved (to econometrician) product characteristic or quality
νit “nested logit” taste parameter
σ nested logit parameter governing within-nest correlation
εirt multinomial logit error term
Dmt total of all route shares in market m during period t
Rmt set of routes operated in market m at time t
qrt market share for route r during period t
ξm time-invariant market-level unobserved product characteristic
ξc time-invariant carrier-level unobserved product characteristic
ξt period-level unobserved product characteristic
mcrt marginal cost of route r in period t
s carrier-specific flight segment
Sr set of segments which compose r
Qst total quantity of passengers on segment s in period t
wst segment-level supply-side characteristics
ωrt route specific error term
ωo origin portion of route error term
ωd destination portion of route error term
ωt period-level portion of route error term
γ supply-side parameter vector
Nr indicator if route r is nonstop
Q̃25 25 percentile of quantity CDF
Q̃50 50 percentile of quantity CDF
Q̃75 75 percentile of quantity CDF
πct profit for carrier c in period t
Rct set of routes operated by carrier c in period t
Sct set of segments operated by carrier c in period t
Trt sum of specific taxes applied to route r in period t
Rcmt set of routes by carrier c in market m in period t
66
REFERENCES
Agrawal, D. R. and D. Foremny (2019). Relocation of the rich: Migration in response to top tax
rate changes from spanish reforms. Review of Economics and Statistics 101(2), 214–232.
Agrawal, D. R. and W. H. Hoyt (2018). Tax incidence in a multi-product world: Theoretical
foundations and empirical implications.
Agrawal, D. R., Q. White, and J. W. Williams (2018a). Taxation in networks: Evidence from the
airline industry. Working paper.
Agrawal, D. R., Q. White, and J. W. Williams (2018b). Taxation in the aviation industry: 1993 to
2016. Working paper.
Bayer, P., F. Ferreira, and R. McMillan (2007). A unified framework for measuring preferences for
schools and neighborhoods. Journal of political economy 115(4), 588–638.
Berry, S., M. Carnall, and P. T. Spiller (1996). Airline hubs: Costs, markups and the implications
of customer heterogeneity. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Berry, S., M. Carnall, and P. T. Spiller (2006). Advances in Airline Economics: Competition
Policy and Antitrust, Volume 1, Chapter Airline Hubs: Costs, Markups, and the Implications of
Consumer Heterogeneity, pp. 183–214. Elsevier.
Berry, S. and P. Jia (2010). Tracing the woes: An empirical analysis of the airline industry. Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2(3), 1–43.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). Automobile prices in market equilibrium. Econo-
metrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 841–890.
Berry, S. T. (1994). Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation. The RAND
Journal of Economics, 242–262.
Besley, T. J. and H. S. Rosen (1999, June). Sales taxes and prices: An empirical analysis. National
Tax Journal 52(2), 157–178.
Borenstein, S. (1989). Hubs and high fares: Dominance and market power in the U.S. airline
industry. Rand Journal of Economics 20, 344–365.
Borenstein, S. and N. L. Rose (1994). Competition and price dispersion in the u.s. airline industry.
Journal of Political Economy 102(4), 653–683.
Bradley, S. and N. E. Feldman (2018). Hidden baggage: Behavioral responses to changes in airline
ticket tax disclosure.
Brueckner, J., N. J. Dyer, and P. T. Spiller (1992). Fare determination in airline hub-and-spoke
networks. The RAND Journal of Economics 23(3), 309–333.
Brueckner, J. and P. T. Spiller (1994). Economies of traffic density in the deregulated airline
67
industry. Journal of Law and Economics 37(2), 379–415.
Brueckner, J. K., D. Lee, and E. S. Singer (2013). Airline competition and domestic us airfares: A
comprehensive reappraisal. Economics of Transportation 2(1), 1–17.
Brueckner, J. K. and P. T. Spiller (1991). Competition and mergers in airline networks. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 9, 323–342.
Cardell, N. S. (1997). Variance components structures for the extreme-value and logistic distribu-
tions with application to models of heterogeneity. Econometric Theory 13(2), 185–213.
Chetty, R., A. Looney, and K. Kroft (2009). Salience and taxation: Theory and evidence. American
Economic Review 99(4), 1145–1177.
Ciliberto, F. and J. W. Williams (2014). Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit collusion? in-
ference on conduct parameters in the airline industry. The RAND Journal of Economics 45(4),
764–791.
Coase, R. H. (1946). Pricing with interrelated costs and demands. Economica 13(52), 278–294.
Conlon, C. T. and N. Rao (2015). The price of liquor is too damn high: Alcohol taxation and
market structure.
Crawford, I., M. Keen, and S. Smith (2011). Value added tax and excises. The Mirrlees Review 4,
275–422.
Delipalla, S. and M. Keen (1992). The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under
imperfect competition. Journal of Public Economics 49, 351–367.
Dubois, P., R. Griffith, and M. O’Connell (2017). How well targeted are soda taxes?
Duso, T., A. Herr, and M. Suppliet (2014). The welfare impact of parallel imports: A structural
approach applied to the german market for oral anti-diabetics. Health economics 23(9), 1036–
1057.
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1925). Papers Relating to Political Economy. London, UK: Royal Economic
Society.
Evans, W. N. and I. N. Kessides (1994). Living by the golden rule: Multimarket contact in the u.s.
airline industry. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(2), 341–366.
Fabra, N. and M. Reguant (2014). Pass-through of emissions costs in electricity markets. American
Economic Review 104(9), 2872–99.
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